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ABSTRACT 
THE IRAQI TURKMEN (1921-2005) 
Kayılı, A.Gökhan 
M.I.R, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
August 2005 
This thesis evaluates the situation of the Iraqi Turkmen between 1921-2005 in 
terms of the important developments in Iraq. The Iraqi Turkmen could not organize  
politically  due to the oppressive Iraqi regimes in the period between 1921-1991. 
They started to carry out political activities openly after the Gulf War II in Northern 
Iraq. The Turkmen who are the third largest ethnic population in Iraq,  pursue the 
policy of keeping  the integrity of Iraqi territory, enjoying  the same equal rights as  
the other ethnic groups and being  a founding member  in the constitution. The 
Turkmen are  still maintaining their political activities to prove their existence in Iraq 
even in 2005. Turkey has defended the idea that the Turkmen should have the same 
political, social and cultural rights as the other ethnic groups in Iraq. The future of 
Kirkuk where the Turkmen live would be a model for Iraq or the start of  serious 
conflicts. 
 
Keywords: Iraqi Turkmen, Iraqi Turkmen Front, Iraq, Kirkuk, KDP, PUK, 
Turkmeneli  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
ÖZET 
IRAK TÜRKMENLERİ (1921-2005) 
Kayılı, A.Gökhan 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Ağustos 2005 
Bu çalışma, 1921-2005 arasındaki tarihsel süreçte Irak Türkmenlerinin 
durumlarını, Irak’ta meydana gelen önemli gelişmeler ışığında incelemiştir. Irak 
Türkmenleri 1921-1991 arası dönemde Irak yönetimlerinin baskıcı tutumları 
neticesinde Irak içinde siyasi açıdan örgütlenememişlerdir. Irak Türkmenleri politik 
mücadelelerine aleni olarak II. Körfez savaşı (1991) sonrası K.Irak bölgesinde 
başlamışlardır. Irak içerisinde üçüncü büyük etnik nufusa sahip Irak Türkmenleri bu 
çercevede Irak’ın toprak bütünlüğünü, diğer etnik gruplarla  eşit haklara sahip olma 
ve anayasada kurucu halk statüsünde olmaları gerektiği tezini savunmaktadırlar. 
Türkmenler 2005 yılına geldiğimiz şu sıralar Irak’taki varlıklarını ispat etme gayesi 
ile siyasi mücadelelerine devam etmektedir. Türkiye’nin Irak Türkmenleri ile ilgili 
ana politikasını Irak’taki diğer etnik gruplar gibi Türkmenlerinde eşit siyasi, sosyal ve 
kültürel haklara sahip olması oluşturmaktadır. Türkmenlerin yoğun olarak yaşadıkları 
Kerkük bölgesinin gelecekteki durumu Irak için bir model teşkil edebileceği gibi, 
problemin başlangıcı olabilecek durumdadır   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Irak Türkmenleri, Irak Türkmen Cephesi, Irak, Kerkük, KDP, 
KYB, Türkmeneli. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
One of the determinants of Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards Iraq1 “The Iraqi 
Turkmen” 2 is on the agenda of Turkish Foreign policy partly after Gulf War II, but 
entirely after the Iraqi War of 2003.  Besides, Turkish public became familiar with 
the subject of “Iraqi Turkmen” after the Iraqi War of 2003. News and articles were 
written in press, TV programs were broadcasted, panels and conferences were held in 
academic fora about them. 
This thesis aims to analyze the situation of Iraqi Turkmen between 1921-
2005. The other objective of this thesis is to examine Turkey’s policy towards the 
Turkmen to make the subject more understandable. The chronology of this thesis 
seems long; however, understanding the current situation of the Turkmen requires it 
to be examined within this period.  
The significance of this study arises from the fact that Iraqi Turkmen have a 
different position in Iraq where the ethnic identities are problematic. The Turkmen 
have been loyal to their country in Iraq since it was founded. They have supported 
the idea of the territorial integrity of Iraq and have maintained the political struggle 
                                                 
1 Turkey-Iraq relations has changed periodically since the foundation of Iraq state, however the 
determinants of this relation depended on developments in the Middle East, the security concerns of 
Turkey (PKK and status of N.Iraq), Water Issue, Economic reasons and the situation of  the Turkmen. 
2 Iraqi Turks were called “Iraqi Turkmen” both during the Lausanne negotiations by the British and 
after the 1958 coup by the Qasim government. The underlying reason for that was to imply that Iraqi 
Turks were different from Anatolian Turks.  During the Lausanne Conference, Ismet Inonu, the lead  
of Turkish Delagation, stated that this did not fit the realities. The Word “Turkmen” was initialized 
after the 1958 coup among the Turkmen, as it refers to the Oghuz who accepted Islam. Therefore, the 
word “Iraqi Turkmen”   instead of  “Iraqi Turks”  will be used in this thesis.  
 2 
to get their rights under Iraq during every period even when ethnic nationalism has 
been rampant. 
 Kirkuk, which has a considerable Turkmen population, is on the world 
agenda since Kurdish groups made some attempts to annex it to Kurdish autonomous 
territory after the Iraqi War of 2003. Even Coalition Authorities have anxieties about 
ethnic conflicts in Iraq which may be triggered from Kirkuk. Neighbouring countries 
of Iraq have cautioned the Kurdish groups about their attempts. For instance, Turkey 
perceives these attempts as a threat to its security, because the possible establishment 
of a “Kurdish state” in the region could well produce instability in Turkey as well as 
in Iraq’s other neighbors. The Turkmen, who were exposed to the Arabization 
policies by the Pan-Arab regimes in Iraq, now, are faced with  Kurdification policies 
along with  human rights abuses. 
 The thesis has three main Chapters. The years which are the turning points 
or determinants for the Turkmen are taken into consideration during the periodization 
of these periods. These dates are; the establishment of the Kingdom of Iraq in 1921, 
the establishment of the No-Fly zone after Gulf War II in 1991 and the Iraqi War in 
2003. 
In the second Chapter, the origins, settlement areas and the population of the 
Turkmen will be described and then the society between 1921-1991 will be 
examined within the Mandate-Kingdom period as well as the Republican period. In 
the republican era, Qasim, Aref Brothers and Baas regime periods will be analyzed. 
The Kirkuk massacre during Qasim’s rule which has not been forgotten by the 
Turkmen will also be examined. 
In the third Chapter, “the Turkmen between 1991-2003”  the process towards 
establishing No-Fly Zone in Northern Iraq, the Turkmen both under   No Fly-zone 
and Baas regime will be examined, and their political movements due to accelaration 
in that period, and  Turkey’s policy towards Turkmen will be analyzed.  
 3 
In the fourth Chapter, “The Turkmen between 2003- May 2005”, the political 
situation of Iraqi Turkmen, Kirkuk Issue, and Turkey’s policy towards the Turkmen 
will be analyzed. In the conclusion part, a concise overall evaluation will be 
presented and projections will be made on subject.  
The methodology used in this study is descriptive. This study heavily relies 
on secondary sources mostly in Turkish, and a few in English in the form of articles, 
books, encylopedia, and TV programs. It is useful to express that sources in foreign 
languages are hard to be found about Turkmen. This may be explained by the fact 
that the subject may not be attractive to foreign researchers. During the research 
period, it was useful to interview the Turkmen who had migrated from different Iraqi 
cities to Turkey for different reasons, and had witnessed important events.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE IRAQI TURKMEN BETWEEN 1921 and 1991 
 
 
 
2.1 The Iraqi Turkmen 
2.1.1 Origins 
 
The Turkmen are the Oghuz who migrated from Central Asia to Iraq. 
According to many researchers, they were named Turkmen after choosing Islam. The 
Turkmen migrated because of many various political situations at different times and 
chose Iraq as their motherland. The immigration of the Turkmen to Iraq occurred in 
different and consecutive times. Namely, during Amawi, Abbasid, Buveyh, Seljuk, 
Celayirli, Ilhanlı, Safawi and Ottoman periods.3 The Turkmen founded some states 
and princedoms in Iraq. These were Iraqi Seljuks, the state of Atabegs(feudal city 
states); Mosul Atabeg(Zengees), Arbil Atabeg, Kirkuk Turkmen Kipchak Princedom, 
Ilhanlı, Celair, Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu states.4  
The first period of the Turkmen settling in Iraq goes back to year 54 of the 
Hegira. This period began when the Amawian commander Ubaydul’Lah Bin Ziyad 
settled 2000 Turkmen in Basrah.5 In addition, Abbasids also took advantage of the 
power and skills of the Turkmen in battles and conflicts.  Especially, because the 
                                                 
3 Nilüfer Bayatlı, “Irak Tarihinde Türkmenler-Turkmen in Iraq History”, Türk Yurdu,  (January 1993), 
pp.6-9., Suphi Saatçi, Tarihten Günümüze Irak Türkmenleri (Iraqi Turkmen from Past to Present), 
(İstanbul:Ötüken Neşriyat, 2003), pp.20-79. 
4 Ekrem Pamukçu and Habib Hürmüzlü, Irak’ta Türkmen Boy ve Oymakları(Turkmen clans and 
nomadic tribes in Iraq), (Ankara:Global Strateji Enstitüsü, 2005), pp.11-17. 
5 Şevket Koçsoy, Irak Türkleri (Iraqi Turks), (İstanbul:Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1991), pp.125-126. 
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Caliph el-Mutasım had great trust in the Turkmen, immigrations never ceased. It can 
be said that this first period laid the groundwork from the point of creating a 
convenient atmosphere and the Turkmen felt comfortable settling in this country. 
The second and the most important period occurred with unceasing immigrations in 
the Seljuk period (1071-1299 AD) after Sultan Tuğrul Beg had entered Baghdad and 
took the reign from Abbasids on 25 January 1055. The third period of Turkmen 
settling in Iraq occurred in the time of Ottoman Empire. Crowded groups of 
Turkmen joined previous settlers in Iraq in 1535, during the reign of Suleiman the 
Magnificent, and in 1638, during the reign of Sultan Murad IV.6  
 
2.1.2 Settlement Areas 
Iraqi Turkmen live in the area extending from northwest to southeast of Iraq, 
which they call Turkmeneli7 as the strip between Kurdish and Arab people. They live 
in Mosul-Yunus Prophet, Arbil, Altunkopru, Kirkuk, Tazehurmatu, Kifri, Karatepe, 
Kızılarbat, Hanekin, Mendeli, Bedre and Sahraban regions towards the east and 
southeast starting from the town of Telafar in the west of Mosul and the villages 
around it.8 In addition, 50 thousand Turkmen families reside in Baghdad. Areas in 
which the Turkmen live are limited within the boundaries of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkük, 
Diala and Selahaddin provinces9. The settlement areas of the Turkmen in Iraq are on 
the itinerary of postal service road constructed between Istanbul and Baghdad.10 
The areas in which the Turkmen live intensively are important because these 
lands include the Kirkuk oil wells, the richest and highest quality oil in both Iraq and 
                                                 
6 Erşat Hürmüzlü, Türkmenler ve Irak (Turkmen and Iraq), (İstanbul:Kerkük Vakfı, 2003), pp.12-14. 
7 See Appendix A, for Turkmeneli Map. 
8 Güçlü Demirci, “Irak Türklerinin Demografik Yapısı-Demografic Structure of Iraqi Turks”, in 
Türkler Ansiklopedisi(Encyclopedia of Turks), (Ankara:Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), Volume:20, 
p.614. 
9 See Appendix B, for Administrative Divisions of Iraq. 
10 İzzeddin Kerkük, Haşim Nahit Erbil ve Irak Türkleri(Hasim Nahit Erbil and Iraqi Turks), 
(İstanbul:Kerkük Vakfı, 2004), p.47. 
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the world; they are the granary of Iraq because they do not have irrigation problems; 
they function as a kind of buffer zone between Arab and Kurdish settlements; they 
have wide agricultural lands and a gentle climate11; and they have rich mines such as 
sulfur, uranium and phosphorus.12 
 
2.1.3 Population  
There are three different estimates about the population of the Turkmen in 
Iraq whose population is estimated to be approximately 24 million.13 While this 
number changes between 10% and 15% relatively within the overall population of 
Iraq according to Turkmen researchers, it is regarded as less than 5% according to 
official Iraqi and western resources. In addition, Kurdish researchers are currently 
trying to acquire political advantages by stating that more Kurdish people live in 
Northern Iraq numerically based on statistical information provided by Iraqi 
authorities.14 
Only the 1957 census among the censuses in 1927, 1934, 1947, 1957, 1965, 
1977 and 198715 held was based on the ethnic structure of communities in Iraq. It 
was found out that 567.000 of the 6.3 million of Iraq’s population were Turkmen 
according to the results of the census announced in 1959.16  Turkmen resources 
calculate the Turkmen population by making projections for today based on this 
census.  
                                                 
11 Mustafa Kayar, Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Irak Sorunu(Iraq Issue in the Turkish-American 
Relations), (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2003), pp.99-100.  
12 Mofak Salman Kerkuklu, Brief History of Iraqi Turkmen (İstanbul:Yıldız Yayıncılık, 2004), p.83. 
13 Suphi Saatçi, “Irak’ın yapılanması ve Türkmenler-The construction of Iraq and Turkmens” in Ali 
Ahmetoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz, Yahya Başkan (ed.), Irak Dosyası(Iraq File), (İstanbul:TATAV, 
2003), p.136. 
14 H.Tarık Oğuzlu, The Turcomans of Iraq as a Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy:Socio-Political and 
Demographic Perspectives, (Ankara:Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 2001), pp.5-13. 
15 Ziyat Köprülü, Irak’ta Türk Varlığı(The Existence of Turks in Iraq), (Ankara,1996), pp.6-7. 
16İbrahim Sirkeci, “Turkmen in Iraq and International Migration of Turkmen”, A report for Global 
Strategy Institute, Ankara, Turkey, January 2005., Zubaida Umar, “The Forgotten Minority of  Iraq”, 
Inquiry(London), February 1987, p.37. 
 7 
In the statistical information provided by Iraqi authorities, the Turkmen has 
been shown as 2% of the overall population because of political reasons. Therefore, 
foreign researchers take this resource as a base in their publications and 
encyclopedias.17 It is stated in Kurdish resources, based on statistical information 
given by the Iraqi government, that the Turkmen population is 2.6 % according to the 
census in 1957 and that this rate was reduced to 1.15 % in the 1977 census.18 
It is estimated that the rate of Shiite Turkmen constitutes %32 of the Turkmen 
population in Iraq.19 The Shiite Turkmen live intensively around Mosul, in the towns 
and villages on the Kirkuk-Baghdad route, particularly in Tavuq and Tuzhurmatu 
regions.20 Besides, there is a small number of Christian Turkmen who live among the 
Iraqi Turkmen.21 It seems impossible to reach precise results of the ethnic and 
religious distribution of communities in Iraq unless an objective census under the 
auspices of international observers is held. Nonetheless, a short history of the 
Turkmen is in order. 
. 
2.2 The Period of Mandate and Kingdom (1920-1958) 
The provinces of Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul which were the center of 
rivalry between the British and Germans as of late 19. century came under British 
rule as a result of the defeat of Ottoman Empire in World War One. The political 
advantages Britain acquired by taking possession of Iraq were clearing off threats 
                                                 
17 Ersin Güngördü, “Irak’ta Siyasi Coğrafya ve Türkler-Political Geography in Iraq and Turks”, 
Kerkük, (April 1992), pp.3-5. 
18Nuri Talabani, Kerkük Bölgesinin Araplaştırılması(Arabization of Kirkuk Region), (İstanbul: Avesta 
Yayınları, 2005), pp.21-22. 
19 Güçlü Demirci, “Irak’taki Türkler-Turks in Iraq” in Ali Ahmetoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz, Yahya 
Başkan (ed.), Irak Dosyası(Iraq File), (İstanbul:TATAV, 2003), p.103. 
20 Suphi Saatçi, “Irak’ın yapılanması ve Türkmenler-The construction of Iraq and Turkmens” in Ali 
Ahmetoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz, Yahya Başkan (ed.), Irak Dosyası(Iraq File), (İstanbul:TATAV, 
2003), p.136. 
21 Enver Yakupoğlu, Irak Türkleri(Iraqi Turks), (İstanbul:Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1976), p.68. 
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against the route to India that could come over Iraq, taking the Abadan oil site in the 
southeast Iran under protection, and taking possession of energy resources upon the 
navy’s conversion to oil instead of coal energy by 1900.22 
The provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk in which Turkmen resided were part of 
the Ottoman Empire during the signing of the Mondros Armistice on 30 October 
1918. The British occupied the region on 3 December 1918, based on article seven of 
the agreement,23 in spite of the fact that the armistice clearly stated that all forces 
keep to their positions at the time of signing the armistice. So, official Turkish 
existence in Iraq, ruled by the Ottoman Empire by the end of the First World War 
came to an end.  
The northern part of Iraq was left to French authority in accordance with the 
Sykes-Picot agreement signed in May 1916 between England and France just while 
World War One continued.24 However, in the San Remo Conference on April 24, 
1920, France waived its claims on Mosul in return for receiving 25 % share of Mosul 
oil revenues and Britain’s evacuation of Syria. So, London acquired the mandate 
authority of Iraq, including Mosul.25  
A meeting was held by the British Middle Eastern experts, in March 1921 in 
Cairo as a consequence of insurgencies26 against the British that started in 1920 in 
both southern and northern regions of the country. At the end of the meeting, it was 
decided that an Arab government would be established in the form of a constitutional 
monarchy in Iraq and Amir Faisal, a member of the Arab Hashmite dynasty and 
                                                 
22 Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, Irak-Iran Cephesi:1914-1918, III.Cilt(Turkish War in First 
World War, Iraq-Iran Front 1914-1918, Volume III), (Ankara:Gn.Kur Basımevi, 1979), p.19. 
23 Article seven of Moudros Armistice was “The Allies to have the right to occupy an strategic points 
in the events of a situation arising which threatens the security of the allies.” 
24 Tayyar Arı, Geçmişten Günümüze Ortadoğu, Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi(From Past To Present 
Middle East, Politics, War and Diplomacy), (İstanbul:Alfa Yayın, 2004), p.136. 
25 Ercüment Kuran, “Musul Meselesi (1515-1926)-Mosul Issue (1515-1926)”, in Mahir Nakip and 
Ziyad Köprülü (ed). Irak Türkleri Sempozyumu (Symposium on Iraqi Turkmen), (Ankara:1987). 
26 The Turkmen joined the 1920 rebellion against British Troops, The heroism of Telafer Turkmen is 
remembered in the Kaçakaç epic. 
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Britain’s old comrade-in arms, would be made king.  Amir Faisal was installed as  
king of Iraq on August 23, 1921, according to the result of a referandum. The British 
claimed that %96 of the Iraqi people chose Faisal I as king.27  
 
2.2.1. The Mosul Issue 
The region comprising Kirkuk, Mosul, Arbil and Suleymaniyah today which 
used to be Mosul Vilayeti in the past has been recorded as the Mosul issue in the 
literature because of debates after World War One, when a diplomatic struggle took 
place between Turkey and Britain about the region.There had been some negotiations 
about reaching a solution about the Mosul issue in the peace conference held in 
Lausanne, and they constituted one of the most difficult parts of the Lausanne 
Conference. The Mosul issue was discussed in two sessions, on January 23, 1923. 
The British delegation lead by Lord Curzon28 argued persistently for the Mosul 
district, which was still under British occupation, to remain within the boundaries of 
Iraq. The British delegation claimed the followings during the negotiations:29 
•  The Mosul Issue was a matter of determining a frontier line and there 
was no need to hold a plebiscite which the Turkish delegation had offered, in the 
region. According to the British, Kurds and Arabs had never asked for a plebiscite; 
besides, they did not even know what really it meant.   
• With the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, both Britain and Iraq had 
undertaken the responsibility of protecting the territorital integrity of the land of Iraq. 
                                                 
27 Mim Kemal Öke, Musul Kerkük Dosyası(Mosul Kirkuk File), (İstanbul,Türk Dünyası Araştırma 
Vakfı Yayınları, 1991), p.33. 
28 Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary was the president of conference. 
29 Kemal Melek, İngiliz Belgeleriyle Musul Sorunu (1890-1926), (Mosul Issue with British Documents 
(1890-1926), (İstanbul:Üçdal Neşriyat, 1983), p.42. 
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Britain therefore could not withdraw from Mosul due to its commitments to Arabs, 
the people of Iraq and  League of Nations.30 
• Based on British statistics31, the British asserted that most of the 
people of Mosul were Arab and Kurdish and Mosul could not be given to Turkey on 
the basis of its Turkish population, which composed only 1/12 of the entire Mosul 
population. 
• Kurds were of Persian origin and they did not support Turks during 
WWI.  
• All the economic relationships of the Mosul Province were with Syria 
and Iraq.  
• Mosul could not be left to Turkey because of the Christian minority 
living in Mosul. 
•  If Turkey took Mosul, the Turkish border would only be 60 km. away 
from Baghdad, which would put Iraq’s security in danger.  
•  Mosul was captured during the war between Turkey and Britain: 
consequently, Britain had the right of conquest over the Mosul province. When the 
armistice was signed, the important Turkish towns of the provinces such as a Kirkuk 
and Altunkopru had already been occupied. The city of Mosul was occupied after the 
armistice was signed because the information that the armistice was signed had 
reached the front late.32 Furthermore, British said that the armistice contained several 
decrees which made the occupation possible, and that a war ends not with an 
armistice but a peace treaty. Furthermore, the British added that there was not any 
connection to oil and the British case.  
                                                 
30 Henry A.Foster, The making for modern Iraq (Oklahoma:University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), 
pp.143-146. 
31 According to British statistics; the population of Mosul was composed of 66000 Turks, 455.000 
Kurds, 186.000 Arabs, 62000 Christians and 17.000 Jews and totally 78600.  
32 İlhan Ş. Kaymaz, Musul Sorunu (Mosul Issue), (İstanbul: Otopsi Yayınları, 2003) pp.274-275. 
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The Turkish delegation33 explained Ankara’s thesis regarding Mosul, which 
was included in the boundaries of the National Oath (Misak-ı Milli) within 
ethnographic, political, historical, geographical economic, military-strategic 
frameworks.34 
• Ethnographic: According to Turkish statistics, the population of 
Mosul province was approximately 503.000. In addition, there were about 170.000 
Turkish, Kurdish and Arab migrant tribes. Because these tribes changed their places 
from season to season, it was imposible to calculate their exact number. According to 
the Turks, the sandjaks of Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleymaniyah were mostly populated 
by Kurds and Turks and the number of Arabs was very few. The Kurds were not 
different from Turks in terms of race, religion and tradition. Turks responded to the 
British claim that Kurds were of Persian origin by stating that Kurds were Turanian 
in race.    
• Political reasons: The annexation of Mosul to Iraq was not possible 
since the Arabs are in the minority; it was not true that Kurds do not want to live 
together with Turks; British troops occupied Mosul after the Mudros Armistice was 
signed in violation of it; Turkey did not believe that there was a necessity for British 
mandate in Iraq. In addition, there was no legal basis for the treaties which aim to 
establish a mandate in Iraq, because it has been a part of Ottoman Empire.  
• Historical reasons: Turks asserted that Mosul had remained under 
Turkish sovereignity since the 11th century. 
• Geographical-Economic Reasons: Turks claimed that Mosul was part 
of Anatolia in view of both its climate and the structure of its land. In terms of 
                                                 
33 The leading person of Turkish delegation was Ismet İnönü, Foreign Minister, the other two 
members were Dr. Rıza Nur, the Minister of Health and Hasan Bey, the Minister of Finance. 
34Kemal Melek, op.cit. pp.34-35.  
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economics, the Mosul province had become more dependent on Anatolia than on 
Iraq because of the railway line that connected Mosul to the Meditarranean. Mosul 
was more dependent on products coming from Turkey than that of Iraq. 
• Military and Strategic Reasons: Turks opposed the British claim that 
the boundary suggested by Turkey, 60 miles from Baghdad, would constitute a threat 
to Iraq. Turks supported this view by pointing out that the capitals of many countries 
were located close to boundaries. Furthermore, Turks claimed that Turks and Arabs 
who had lived together peacefully for centuries would never attack each other. 
It was understood that there were significant contradictions between the 
claims of Ankara and London. When the Mosul issue began to impede the 
conference, parties decided to postpone the resolution of the problem until after the 
conference. Pursuant to article 3 and paragraph 2 of the Lausanne Peace Agreement, 
signed on July 24, 1923, the boundary between Turkey and Iraq would be designated  
free of dispute between Turkey and Great Britain for nine months. In case of a 
dispute between the two governments at this time, the dispute would be presented to 
the League of Nations (LoN). While waiting the decision about the boundaries, no 
military activities would be carried out that could cause a change in the current 
situation of the region.35 
Halic Conference was held in Istanbul on May 19-June 5, between the 
Turkish and British delegations.36 The Turkish delegation demanded a boundary 
including the cities of Suleymaniyah, Kirkuk and Mosul. In return for this, a joint 
corporation in the Mosul petroluem would be offered to Britain. The Turkish 
delegation particularly emphasized Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood and the very fact 
                                                 
35 İsmail Soysal, Tarihçe ve Açıklamaları ile birlikte Türkiye’nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları(Political 
Agreements of  Turkey with History and Explanations), (Ankara:TTK, 1983), Volume I, p.87. 
36 During Halic Conference, the head of the British delegation was Sir Percy Cox, the British High 
Commissioner in Iraq until September 5, 1923, and the head of the Turkish delegation was Fethi 
Okyar,  president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
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that the majority of the Mosul province was composed Kurds and Turks. The British 
delegation, in return, argued the problem of the future of Nastorian Christians. 
British not only demanded the province of Mosul, but also the villages of 
Beytüşşebap, Çölemerik, and Revandiz, which were within the borders of Hakkari at 
that time, for the Nastorian Christians, who had migrated to Iraq.37 It was understood 
that there were significant contradiction between the claims of the two governments. 
The British tried to prevent the problem from being resolved and tried it to be 
negotiated in the LoN. The Halic Conference could not reach a solution and ended on 
June 5, 192438. The Mosul issue was handled in the Council Meeting of the LoN on 
September 20, 1924 upon London’s application. The two governments’ arguments 
differed little from those made at Lausanne. Britain still argued for delimitatition of a 
frontier line and Turkey for the whole provinces. The Turks still referred to 
themselves and the Kurds of Mosul as a unit, constituting a majority. Turkey 
defended the view that the most appropriate course of action was to apply a 
plebiscite in the Mosul province, but Britain claimed that the LoN’s duty was only to 
draw a border between Iraq and Turkey. 
 The British demanded that a commission composed of impartial persons 
should be established. LoN made the decision that a commission would be 
established in order to find out the wishes of the people in Mosul, to collect 
information by negotiating with the Turkish, Iraqi and British authorities and to 
prepare reports in light of this information. In addition, some members from Turkey 
and Britain would be appointed to help and counsel the commission. The 
                                                 
37 Mim Kemal Öke, Musul Meselesi Kronolojisi(1918-1926) (Cronology of Mosul Issue (1918-1926), 
(İstanbul:Türk Dünyası Araştırma Vakfı,1987), pp.130-131. 
38 Ercüment Kuran, “Musul Meselesi (1515-1926)-Mosul Issue (1515-1926)”, in Mahir Nakip and 
Ziyad Köprülü (ed). Irak Türkleri Sempozyumu (Symposium on Iraqi Turkmen), (Ankara:1987). 
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commission39 in question was established on September 30, 1924. The commission 
started its work on January 16, 1925, and was directed by the British in Iraq 
throughout its work. The commission proposed in the report it presented to the 
Council in September 1925 that Mosul should be ruled under British mandate for 25 
years, and that the border between Turkey and Iraq should be the line which had 
been drawn in Brussels. As a result of Turkey’s objections, advisory opinion was 
requested from the Permanent Court of International Justice on September 19, 1925. 
Upon the negative decision made by the aforementioned Court, the Council of LoN 
decided, by considering the opinions of the Inquiry Commission and the Court in the 
meeting on December 16, 1925 in which the Turkish committee did not participate, 
that the border between Turkey and Iraq would be the Brussels line40 and that Mosul 
would be placed in Iraq under British mandate due to a new agreement between 
Baghdad and London.41 The Turkish Parliament and public reacted against this 
decision, yet Turkey chose to reach an agreement with Britain. The reasons why 
Turkey was obliged to abandon this particular objective of the National Pact may be 
explained as follows: 
• Turkey was still a militarily and diplomatically isolated country. Therefore; 
Turkey’s estrangement from the international arena was an important external factor. 
• Turkey had been at war throughout 10 years from 1911 to 1922. 
                                                 
39 The members of the commission were Count Teleki, the former Prime Minister of Hungary, De 
Wirsen, former Swedish Ambassador to Bucharest, and Colonel Paulis, a Belgian Veteran Officer. 
40 Brussels Line was determined in November 1924 as a temporary line as a result of Turkey’s 
application  to League of Nations because of border clashes. According to Brussels Line, Mosul was 
left to Iraq while Hakkari was left to Turkey.  
41 For details of  Mosul Issue; See Mesut Aydın, Türkiye ve Irak Hududu Meselesi(Turkey and Iraq 
Border Issue), (Ankara:ASAM, 2001), Raif Karadağ, Musul Raporu(Mosul Report), (İstanbul:Emre 
Yayınları, 2003). 
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• Turkey wanted to repair damages caused by war, commit to a development 
in peace and stability, and lead itself to modernization by taking advantage of the 
peaceful atmosphere.  
• It was very risky and non-realistic for Turkey to maintain the never-ending 
conflict and disagreement with Great Britain which was the Great power of the 
time.42 
 
2.2.1.1 The Ankara Agreement 
The Ankara Agreement, signed between the governments of Britain, Turkey 
and Iraq on June 5, 1926, consists of three parts, Borders, Good Relationships with 
Neighbors and General provisions, consisting of 18 articles.43 Article four of the 
agreement makes the decision that the citizenship of residents in the lands given to 
Iraq shall be regulated pursuant to article 30 and 36 of the Laussanne agreement, and 
those who reside in the region had been awarded with electoral franchise and the 
right to transfer freely their residence within 12 months as of the effective date of the 
agreement. The Turkmen would either migrate to Turkey pursuant to article 31 or 
use the right to become a national of Iraq within the time appointed in accordance 
with article 30 of the Lausanne Agreement. A very small number of Turkmen 
families or individuals took advantage of article 31.44 
Suphi Saatçi, a Turkmen scholar, stated that one of the crucial weaknesses of 
the agreement was that no legal guarantees about the Iraqi Turkmen had been 
included in it, and that Turkey could have played a more active role about the 
                                                 
42 “Türk İngiliz Münasebetleri ve Musul Meselesi-Turco-Anglo Relations and Mosul Issue” in 
Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası(1919-1973)(Turkish Foreign Policy by events)(1919-1973), 
(Ankara:A.Ü.S.B.F Yayınları, Sevinç Matbaası, 1974), p.81. 
43 Süleyman Doğan, “Irak’ta Petrol Savaşı ve Türkmenler-Petroluem War in Iraq and Turkmen”, 
Kardaşlık, (January –March 2003), p.17. 
44 Zubaida Umar, “The Forgotten Minority of  Iraq”, Inquiry(London), (February 1987), p.39. 
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massacres and dramas the Iraqi Turkmen suffered in later periods if a guarantee 
article that would provide sanctions regarding the Iraqi Turkmen had been included 
in the agreement45.  
Regarding the 1926 Agreement, Bilal Şimşir, a retired ambassador, 
emphasized that Turkey laid minority claims to  Turks in Western Thrace and in 
Bulgaria with various agreements, but it did not do the same for the Iraqi Turkmen 
and he stated that the reason for this can be explained by historical and political 
factors. In addition, he emphasized that the word “minority” means non- Muslims in 
Turkey, and it would be an incoherent and contradictional approach for Turkey to 
acknowledge the Muslim Turkmen as a minority in the 1926 Ankara Agreement, 
three years after the Lausanne Peace Agreement. Besides, Şimşir stated that the 
Turkmen nowadays regard themselves as the third essential ethnic element of Iraq 
after Arabs and Kurds because they had not been regarded as a minority in the 1926 
Agreement.46 
 
2.2.2 The situation of the Turkmen people in the time of Mandate and 
Kingdom  
The first interim government was established on October 25, 1920, with the 
prime ministry of Abdurrahman El-Geylani. Izzet Pasha Kerkuklu, a Turkmen, was 
appointed the Minister of National Education and Health. Kerküklü was appointed as 
the Minister of Public Works on January 29, 1921 in the second government, but he 
resigned in April 1922, and no Turkmen has ever been appointed to any ministry 
after this date.47  
                                                 
45 Suphi Saatçi, “Masum Irak Türkmenleri desteklenmelidir-Oppressed Iraqi Turkmens should be 
supported”, Türk Yurdu, (January 1993), pp.11-14. 
46 Bilal N.Şimşir, op.cit., pp.72-74. 
47 Erşat Hürmüzlü, op.cit., p.43. 
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The Kingdom of Iraq formed its policy based on denial and disposal of the 
Turkmen as of its establishment. Iraq considered that it could be absorbed by its 
powerful neighbor, Turkey without British support during the time of Feisal I (1921-
1933), and resorted to massacre the Turkmen population and to deny their existence 
in this country48.  
The fundamental policy of the decision-makers of the newly founded Iraq 
was to completely exclude the two main elements of insurgency against the British 
troops in 1920, the Turkmen and Shiite Arabs, from the system. Also, the policy to 
ignore the Turkmen in political arena while the disagreement about Kirkuk and 
Mosul was continuing has been effective.49 
The Turkmen supported Turkey because of ethnic, religious, historical and 
political reasons, boycotted the referendum on the election of Feisal I as king of Iraq 
in 192150, and they held out against the British invasion and British mandate under 
the auspices of the LoN. A large number of Turkmen officials resigned from their 
positions for their reactions.51 
With the founding of the state of Iraq, the Turkmen found themselves in an 
atmosphere that was different from the past in social, economic and political fields. 
Because of the difficult conditions and limited opportunities they had, it seemed 
possible for them to refuse the new government certainly, and to hold out against the 
government consistently. It was not so easy for the Turkmen to comply with the new 
situation in psychological and historical terms. As a consequence, they felt politically 
                                                 
48 Kadir Mısıroğlu, Musul Meselesi ve Irak Türkleri(Mosul Issue and Iraqi Turks), (İstanbul:Sebil 
Yayınevi, 1985), p.191. 
49 Aydın Beyatlı, “Siyasi Konjonktürde Irak Türkmenleri-Iraqi Turkmen in political conjunture”, 
Kerkük, (November 1998), pp.8-12.  
50 Nefi Demirci, Kerkük (Kerkük’ün Siyasi Tarihi)(Kirkuk (The Political History of Kirkuk), 
(İstanbul:Detay Ofset, 1986), p.22. 
51 Aziz Kadir Samancı, Irak Türkmenlerinin Siyasi Tarihi(Political History of Iraqi Turkmen), 
(London, Dar Al-Alsaqi, 1999), p.49. 
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isolated and became introverted. This situation made their political role weaker and 
caused the Turkmen to be isolated from the political equations in Iraq.52 
On May 4, 1924, the Teyyari (Levy) 53 forces under the British, carried out a 
massacre in Kirkuk. As a result of the quarrel with the Teyyari soldiers in the bazaar 
in Kirkuk, reinforcement troops reached the region, and attacked people with gunfire, 
and looted workplaces belonging to the Turkmen, and killed activist Turkmen. It was 
hoped that the growing national awareness among the Turkmen people would be 
suppressed by massacre.54 The reaction of the Turkmen in Kirkuk caused a 
notification to be given out by H.Dobs, a British Political officer, on May 5, 1924. In 
accordance with the aforementioned notification, it was decided that the Levies 
would be transferred to the Suleymaniyah-Chamcamal region immediately, and 
compensation was paid to those who suffered from the incident.55 
Hasim Nahit Erbil wrote in Hakimiyet-i Milliye(Ankara) on August 7, 1925 
about the 1924 massacre where he stated that the massacre in Kirkuk, when 
nationalist consciousness was brewing, had been implemented in order to prevent the 
Turkmen from acting in favor of Turkey at a period during which the Mosul 
negotiations were going on.56 
The first constitution of Iraq was issued by the constituent assembly in 
Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish, and it entered into force on March 21, 1925. Article 16 
of this constitution entitled the Turkmen to provide education in their native 
                                                 
52 Ibid., pp.60-61. 
53 The Levy was established of Assryrians and was supported by British, and particularly was used 
during the 1920 rebellion. 
54 Arshad Al-Hirmizi, The Turkmen Reality in Iraq, (İstanbul:Kirkuk Foundation, 2005), p.79. 
55 Şemsettin Küzeci, Kerkük Soykırımları(Kirkuk Genocides), (Ankara:Teknoed Yayınları, 2004), p. 
39. 
56 İzzeddin Kerkük, Haşim Nahit  Erbil ve Irak Türkleri(Hasim Nahit Erbil and Iraqi Turkmen), 
(İstanbul:Kerkük Vakfı, 2004), p.134. 
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language. In addition, there was to be no segregation in terms of ethnicity and 
politics.57  
Iraqi nationalists opposing the mandate authority politically, organized 
against Britain and pressed the Iraqi government. As a result of the pressures, Iraq 
gained its independence with an agreement signed on June 30, 1930. Despite this 
fact, the benefits of England in the region have not been forgotten.58   
The Iraqi Turkmen were entitled to certain rights by the Iraqi government in 
the period when the relationship between Turkey and Iraq was improving. During 
King Feisal’s visit to Turkey on July 8, 1931, the Code of Local Languages 
(Number: 74) was put into effect. The Turkish dialect which was called Turkmen 
language by the Iraqi people was recognized as one of the local languages. In 
accordance with this code, it was accepted that court trials would be carried out in 
the Turkmen language in some Turkmen regions, primarily Kirkuk and Arbil, and it 
was decided that education in primary schools would be completely in Turkish in 
places where Turkmen lived and were in a majority.59  
One of the two crucial documents acknowledging the existence of Turkmen 
in Iraq and entitling them some rights was the declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq 
which was announced under the signature of Nouri Said Pasha, the Prime Minister, 
upon Iraq’s membership to the LoN on May 30, 1932.60 It was expressed in article 9 
of the declaration that Turkish would be an official language besides Arabic in 
Kirkuk and Kifri where the Turkmen were in the majority. In addition, it was decided 
                                                 
57 Habib Hürmüzlü, “Irak’ın Hukuki Yapısında Türkmenlerin Yeri-The Turkmen in the legal structure 
of Iraq” in Ali Ahmetoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz, Yahya Başkan (ed.), Irak Dosyası(Iraq File), 
(İstanbul:TATAV, 2003), p.128. 
58 In accordance with the agreement between England and Iraq, Iraq would consult England about 
foreign policies and common benefits; make available its ports, railways and other facilities to 
England in case of war; and the English military bases in Iraq would continue their activities 
59 Bilal N. Şimşir, Türk Irak İlişkilerinde Türkmenler (Turkmen in Turkey-Iraq Relations), 
(Ankara:Bilgi Yayınevi, 2004), p.40. 
60 Aydın Beyatlı, “Siyasi Konjonktürde Irak Türkmenleri-Iraqi Turkmens in political conjuncture”  
Kerkük, (November 1998), pp.8-12. 
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in other paragraphs of this article that the officials employed in this region would be 
Turkmen and that they were required to speak Turkish language. Furthermore, the 
Turkmen were entitled to use their language in courts, to carry out activities in press 
and information in Turkish, as well as in schools, offering education in their native 
language in places where they were in the majority.61 The aforementioned rights of 
the Turkmen, which were regarded as superior to all laws including the constitution, 
were registered with this declaration, and were recorded in the League of Nations.62  
The relationships between Turkey and Iraq improved to a considerable level 
with the visit King Feisal I to Ankara on July 8, 1931. As a result of this visit, 
negotiations for new agreements between Turkey and Iraq started. “Regulation, 
Trade and Residence Agreements” were signed on January 9, 1932 in Ankara. The 
Residence Agreement was ratified on June 4, 1932 in the Turkish Parliament and put 
into effect on July 6, 1933. The residence of Turkish nationals in Iraq and the 
residence of Iraqi nationals’ in Turkey, and right to have employment and  property 
for them in both countries were regulated.63 After the residence agreement was put 
into effect, the relationship with Turkey of some of the Turkmen taking advantage of 
the agreement became easier. Therefore, visitations between Iraq and Turkey 
increased, and the Turkmen were entitled to reside, work, carry out trade, acquire 
property and send their children to schools in Turkey. 64 
It was expressed in article 17 of the 1933 Iraqi Constitution that the official 
language in Iraq would be Arabic except for circumstances indicated by law. The 
                                                 
61 For a 1932 Declaration see Suphi Saatçi, Tarihten Günümüze Irak Türkmenleri (From past  to 
present Iraqi Turkmen), (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2003), pp. 200-206. 
62 Habib Hürmüzlü, “Irak’ın Hukuki Yapısında Türkmenlerin Yeri-The Turkmen in the legal structure 
of Iraq” in Ali Ahmetoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz, Yahya Başkan (ed.), Irak Dosyası(Iraq File), 
(İstanbul:TATAV, 2003), p.130. 
63 Yaşar Canatan, Türk Irak Münasebetleri(1926-1958)(Turkey-Iraq Relations (1926-1958), (Ankara: 
T.C Kültür Bakanlığı Başvuru Kitapları, 1996), pp.44-45. 
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exceptional circumstances were included in the Code of Local Languages, number 
74 which was published in 1931.65  
Although cultural rights of the Turkmen were guaranteed by some laws, 
education in Turkish was forbidden in the primary schools except for the ones in the 
Kirkuk city center by the Iraqi Government as of the 1930-1931 academic year. 
Turkish language courses were reduced to one hour a week and were treated as a 
foreign language in a few Kirkuk schools. In 1937, the Baghdad government 
terminated this implementation completely. Furthermore, officials of Turkmen origin 
were employed in areas outside the Turkmen regions, and officers, soldiers, 
policemen and gendarmes of Arab and Kurdish origin were appointed persistently to 
Kirkuk and towns around it.66 Between 1936 and 1958, the Turkmen were banned to 
found associations carrying out social and cultural activities, and to publish in the 
Turkish language.67 
The Iraqi government generally took steps in order to carry out the 
Arabization of the region and to change the ethnic structure as of the 1930s. The 
government put the Al Huvayca irrigation project into effect in order to settle Arab 
tribes on the Al Huvayca plain in the southwest of Kirkuk, and distributed the lands 
in the scope of this project to members of the Al-Ubeyd and Al- Cubur tribes and to 
members of other Arab tribes.68 This period became the beginning of the process of 
settling Arabs in Kirkuk, which was planned and implemented by both the Kingdom 
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and the governments that followed. Meanwhile, lands of the Turkmen were 
expropriated by the government.69 
Bilal Şimşir stated that the developments towards the solution of the Hatay 
issue70 worsened the Turkmen situation in Iraq during the time of The Kingdom. The 
Baghdad government tought that another Hatay would be created in Northern Iraq if 
the rights of the Turkmen were upheld; therefore, it put pressure on the Turkmen 
society, and followed the policy of Arabization. The evaluation of the Iraqi 
government on the Hatay issue was used as an excuse for putting pressure on the 
Turkmen71 
Italy’s policy of expansion to Asia and Africa after 1934 under the leadership 
of Mussolini72 caused Turkey, which thought that the security in the Middle East and 
Mediterranean were in danger, to look for alliances with eastern states.73 In view of 
the Italian expansion, Turkey initialized the Pact of Nonaggression with Iraq and Iran 
on October 2, 1935. This document initialized by three neighboring countries was 
converted into the Sadabad Pact with the participation of Afghanistan. The pact was 
signed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in the Sadabad Palace in Simran 
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on July 8, 1937 after the boundary convention had been signed between Iraq and 
Iran.74 
Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the Foreign Minister, and Celal Bayar, Minister of the 
Economy, and the Turkish delegation in Baghdad during the last stages of the 
Sadabad Pact visited Mosul and Kirkuk on June 27, 1937.75 The visit of the Turkish 
delegation to Mosul, Arbil and Kirkuk caused excitement among the Iraqi Turkmen.  
This disturbed the Iraqi authorities. Regarding the matter, the prime minister Nouri 
Said Pasha stated in the report he had given to the Cabinet after returning to 
Baghdad: “The Turks should be kept under pressure all the time. They are likely to 
possess and rule us one day as they possessed and ruled the Abbasid state. We have 
just got rid of the Turkish authority, therefore let us do not allow them to do it again, 
let us be careful.”76 
Hundreds of Turkmen intellectuals were arrested or exiled to southern 
districts after the visit of the Turkish delegation. The Iraqi government took severe 
measures against the Turkmen in the following periods. Social and cultural activities 
of the Turkmen were banned, and historical Turkish buildings were vandalized, and 
the demografic structure of the Turkmen settled areas began to change with the 
settlement of Arabs in the region.77 
The Iraqi Turkmen were gradually exposed to a policy of assimilation by the 
state between 1936 and 1941. It was decided to disperse the Turkmen population 
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which were in the majority, by appointing  Turkmen officials out of Turkmen settled 
areas. Those who opposed this implementation were severely punished.78 
A Treaty of Amity and Good Neighborhood was signed between Turkey and 
Iraq in the presence of Nouri Said Pasha, the Iraqi Prime Minister and Hasan Saka, 
the Foreign Minister of Turkey, on March 29, 1946. In the additional protocol of 
article 6 of this treaty, the Protocol of Educational and Cultural Cooperation was 
signed between Turkey and Iraq.79 The Protocol of Educational and Cultural 
Cooperation under the Turkish-Iraqi Treaty of Amity provided the Iraqi Turkmen 
new horizons and important gains. When all of the diplomas given by Iraqi schools 
were regarded as valid, Iraqi youngsters started to flow into Turkey and to attend 
Turkish schools. This situation was a privilege for the Iraqi Turkmen at the same 
time.80 
A number of strikes for wage increases against the Iraq Oil Company, 
including demands for providing the workers accommodation, regulated working 
hours, paid holidays, free transport for the workers were held in  Kirkuk as of July 3-
16, 1946. Since no agreement was reached in the negotiations with the governor on 
July 12 about the release of those arrested due to the strike, a demonstration was held 
in the Gavurbağı (Gavurbahgi) district and on the same day,  5 Turkmen were killed, 
and 14 Turkmen were injured because of the over reaction of the policemen against 
the demonstrators. This incident has been recorded as the Massacre of Gavurbahgi.81 
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Both the Levy Massacre in 1924 and the Gavurbahgi Massacre in 1946 had 
negative effects on Turkmen society. These incidents forced the Turkmen into 
political isolation.82 
With the agreement signed between Turkey and Iraq on February 24, 1955 
the Baghdad Pact83 was established. While the relationships between Turkey and Iraq 
were improving with this pact with 8 articles offering cooperation in security and 
defense affairs, Iraq increased the pressures on and assimilation of the Turkmen who 
were its own nationals. The situation of the Iraqi Turkmen was not mentioned in the 
agreements signed between Turkey and Iraq. The prohibition against Turkish 
language continued. While the friendship between Turkey and Iraq were improving, 
the Iraqi government increased pressures on the Turkmen day by day.84 
  
2.3 The period of Republic (1958-1991) 
Some political and military developments which directly affected Iraq such as 
the foundation of Israel in the Middle East in 1948 with British support; Israel’s 
victory in the first Arab-Israeli war; rising to ascedance of Gamal Abdul Nasser, who 
was regarded as the leader of Arab nationalism in Egypt in 1952, the signing of the 
Baghdad Pact in 1955 took place in this period.  
The monarchy was abolished and the Republic was founded in Iraq upon the 
coup carried out in the leadership of General Abdulkerim Qasim with cooperation of 
the leftist and Arab nationalist officers on July 14, 1958.85 The political 
developments that affected the Iraqi Turkmen in the era of the republic were 
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determined by the political and military coups in this period. The state of the Iraqi 
Turkmen in this period is going to be reviewed in consideration of these 
developments.  
 
2.3.1 Abdulkerim Qasim Period (1958-1963) 
2.3.1.1 Iraqi Turkmen in the Abdulkerim Qasim Period 
After the coup on July 14, 1958, General Abdulkerim Qasim and his deputy 
General Abdul Al-Salem Aref declared that Iraq was composed of three essential 
ethnic groups, including the Turkmen as one of these groups in their speech during 
the proclamation of the republic over the radio. The Turkmen regarded this statement 
as the termination of their oppression. They were in support of this coup, anticipating 
transparency democracy.86 Hereby, supportive telegrams were dispatched to Qasim 
and his assistants, and Turkmen committees were sent to Baghdad.87 
The new government published a temporary constitution on July 27, 1958 
and cancelled the equity of nationals for the first time, stating in article three: “The 
existence of Iraq is based on the cooperation of all nationals, keeping their rights and 
guaranteeing their freedom. The country is jointly owned by Arabs and Kurds, and 
their national rights are protected within the unity of Iraq”. With this article, the 
Turkmen were not mentioned in the constitution, their status being reduced to that of 
a minority.88 
2.3.1.1.1 The Kirkuk Massacre   
After the coup in 1958, severe conflicts between the ideological and 
intellectual schools occurred in Iraq, especially between internationalism and Arab 
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nationalism. The Turkmen society had to stand up against the Communist Party in 
cooperation with the Kurdish nationalist movement, because they did not internalize 
the Communist idea. It became natural for the Turkmen to support Arab nationalists 
without making any discrimination between Nationalists and BAAS during the 
challenge posed between the two schools which spread all around the country, 
namely Arab Nationalism and Communism. Yet, their situation was not established 
by a certain agreement concluding an alliance under specific conditions.89 
Mollah Mustafa Barzani90 returned to Iraq after the coup in 1958 and visited 
Kirkuk on October 22 and 24, 1958. His visit urged activities against the Turkmen 
and caused tension between Kurdish groups and the Turkmen. Furthermore, on 
January 13, 1959, a coffeehouse, which was much-frequented by the Turkmen, was 
assaulted by Kurds.  
The insurgency which took place against Communists in Mosul on March 8, 
1959 by Lieutenant Colonel Es-Sevvaf was suppressed bloodily. As a consequence 
of the Es-Sevvaf Movement, Nadhim Al Tabakchali91 was removed from office, on 
the basis of his cooperation with Es-Sevvaf. Dawood-Al-Janabi, who was in favor of 
Communism, was appointed to his position. Maruf el-Berzenci was appointed as the 
mayor of Kirkuk, and Ojin, of Armenian origin, was appointed as the chief of the 
Organization of Public Resistance. Hence, it was Kurds and Communists who were 
appointed to the administration. The Communist Kurds who entered Kirkuk under 
cover until July 14, 1959 were armed. The purpose of the plan was two fold: 
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preventing the loyalty of the Turkmen society; and changing the demographic 
structure of the city by using Communism as a cover was put into effect.92 
The purpose of the Turkmen who participated in the first anniversary 
celebrations of the coup on July 14, 1959 may be explained as their wish to get rid of 
their political isolation and to announce their will to interact with politics that would 
determine the fate of Iraq. On July 14, 1959 at around 19.30, the first gunfire sounds 
were heard and the Turkmen were attacked. It was Osman Hıdır, the owner of the 
coffeehouse, “July 14” that was first killed. This was the start of the process that 
would last for three days and that would be recorded in history as the Kirkuk 
Massacre. A curfew order was announced by the Commandership of the Second 
Division, which later turned out to be applied only to the Turkmen. Some important 
Turkmen persons such as Retired Colonel Ata Hayrullah, Cahit Fahrettin and Kasım 
Neftci were executed. Shops, stores, trade centers and houses belonging to the 
Turkmen were looted.93 
Habib Hurmuzlu stated in his article regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages that came with the Kirkuk Massacre. According to him, losing the 
leading persons caused a disaster in a society which was unorganized, inexperienced 
and frightened. After the massacre, immigrations to Baghdad took place due to a 
possible repetition of events of July 14 coupled with instability and unemployment 
problems. The anarchy of Kirkuk resulted in replacing the Turkmen with Kurds and 
Arabs who were injected to the region. The Arabs in southern Iraq had not been 
aware of the existence of the Turkmen throughout the Kingdom era because of the 
policies of the Baghdad governments.  They called Turkmen “Kırad” which means 
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Kurdish. It was just a while before the proclamation of the Republic that the Iraqi 
Turks were named “Turkmen”. The Iraqi Turks adopted this name in a short time. 
The reason was that the Arabs constituting the majority in Iraq would know them 
with their own identity by means of this new name, which relieved the Iraqi Turkmen 
psychologically. After the massacre news hit the headlines everyday, the word 
Turkmen settled properly as the name of a third society in Iraq. The Turkmen 
became center of interest between anti-communist Arabs, intellectuals and journalists 
in Iraq thanks to the massacre. After the massacre, the Baghdad radio extended the 
duration of its program in the Turkmen language and reinforced it. Turkmen 
Brotherhood Association94 was established by those who had migrated from Kirkuk 
and resided in Baghdad.95 Nefi Demirci also noted in his book that the unity, 
cooperation and the interdependency among the Turkmen increased after the 
massacre of 1959.96 
On July 28, 1959, General Abdulkerim Qasim held a press conference, and 
castigated those who carried out the massacre in Kirkuk. He showed the journalists 
pictures taken during the massacre against the Turkmen in Kirkuk. Two-hundred and 
sixty persons including Davud-Al Cenabi, who was primarily responsible for the 
massacre in Kirkuk, were arrested. Some of the leaders who were tried in the 
Military Tribunal were condemned to death. The rest were released although they 
had participated in the 1959 massacre. Those who had been condemned to death 
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were not executed.97 Upon these events, the Turkmen founded secret organizations, 
and tried to take revenge of the Turkmen who were killed.98 Nouri Talabani 
expressed that the Kirkuk Massacre and the events after it caused separation and 
hostility between the Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk the effects of which can be 
traced to this day.99 
The news related to the massacre in Kirkuk reached Turkey as of July 19th. 
Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, the Foreign Minister of the time, called Ankara’s Ambassador to 
Iraq and requested him to obtain guarantee about the safety of the Turkmen in Iraq.  
Fuat Bayramoğlu, Ambassador of Turkey in Baghdad, delivered a message 
from Adnan Menderes to General Qasim on July 25, 1959, where the Foreign 
Ministry of Turkey noted that some unfortunate events occurred in Kirkuk and 
approximately 30 Iraqi Turkmen nationals were killed.100  
Meanwhile, the Moscow radio stated that the Kirkuk events had been started 
by the Turks who intended to possess the Mosul oil district. The Turkish 
Government expressed in the notice it published on July 28, 1959 that the statements 
of the Moscow radio were simply untrue.101 
 When the news from Tel-Aviv, Damascus and Cairo started to be published 
in the press, indignation aroused among the Turkish public. In order to avoid 
agitation of the Turkish public opinion, news conferences on Kirkuk events were not 
permitted. The Council of Ministers banned pictures, films and documents related to 
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the Kirkuk massacre to enter Turkey and be distributed, with its decision of October 
21, 1959.102 
The first educational congress of the Iraqi Turkmen was held in Kirkuk on 
August 30, 1960. In the congress, important decisions regarding Turkish education 
were taken. Decision taken by the congress to publish a magazine both in Turkish 
and Arabic, could was never realized that year. 103 
 
2.3.2 Aref Brothers’ Period (1963-1968) 
The authority of General Qasim started to decline through internal and 
external problems after 1961. The Kurds who had conflicting interests with the 
government started an armed insurgency. Several disagreements occurred inside the 
army. Besides, Qasim’s attempts to restrict the interests of foreign oil companies and 
threats against Kuwait caused Great Britain and the Arab countries to oppose 
Qasim’s authority. A group of officers cooperating with the Arab Socialist BAAS 
Party ended the Qasim administration through a coup in February 1963.104 
The coup against Qasim’s authority was carried out by Arab nationalists 
consisting of three groups. One was Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Al-Salem Aref who 
had toppled the Monarchy together with Qasim, and who was the leader of the group 
in favor of Naser. The second group was the Arab BAAS Party under  the leadership 
of Ahmed Hasan El-bekr, and the third group was the Iraqi nationalists who were not 
devoted to Naser, called Kavmi.105 
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Those who had carried out the coup in 1963 preferred to stay in the backstage 
and left the administration to the BAAS Party. Abdul Al-Salem Aref was awarded 
the presidency and legislative authority. The executive power was given to the 
Council of National Revolutionist Command that consisted of civilian and military 
persons. During this new era, Colonel Ahmed Hasan El-Bekr was awarded the Prime 
Ministry. The communists were damaged severely for the first time. Abdul Al-Salem 
Aref, intended to follow a policy resembling that of  Naser in Iraq, and assumed 
authority by getting rid of the BAAS Party which he regarded as an obstacle in 
implementing his policies in a short time.  Some of the prominent Turkmen and 
administrators of the Turkmen Brootherhood Association visited Aref, and expressed 
the cruelties and injustice they had been experienced.106 Those 28 persons who had 
been condemned to death as perpetrators holders and operators of the Kirkuk 
massacre were executed in three different squares of Kirkuk on June 23, 1963. Thus, 
the military junta took an important step to win the Turkmen. The Turkmen began to 
live in a more stable period.107  
 
2.3.2.1 The Iraqi Turkmen in the period of Aref Brothers 
The new regime published a new and temporary constitution on April 29, 
1964. Pursuant to the interim constitution in 1964, the 1958 constitution was 
cancelled and abolished. It was emphasized in article 19, that the Iraqi people were 
equal without any discrimination based on ethnic structures, languages, or other 
reasons, and without considering differences in rights and duties.108  
                                                 
106 Fazıl Demirci, op.cit., pp.25-26. 
107 Nefi Demirci, op.cit.,p.78 
108 Habib Hürmüzlü, “Irak’ın Hukuki Yapısında Türkmenlerin Yeri-Turkmen in the legal structure of 
Iraq” in Ali Ahmetoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz, Yahya Başkan (ed.), Irak Dosyası(Iraq File), 
(İstanbul:TATAV, 2003), p.132. 
 33 
Between 1963 and 1968, the Turkmen acquired the opportunity to benefit 
from civil rights since 1923 for the first time. Although they still lacked the right to 
have education in Turkish and many other socio-cultural rights. But, having lived 
decently and humanely and being treated as nationals partially made the Turkmen 
pleased at that time. The Turkish part in the new Turkish alphabet was added to the 
part in the old Turkish script in the magazine Qardaslık between 1963 and 1968. 
Cultural synergy disappeared with the difference in the alphabets and literacy in the 
Latin alphabet was encouraged. The Turkmen felt at ease and their visitations to 
Turkey were facilated.109 
In 1966, Abdul Al-Salem Aref died in a helicopter accident, and his brother 
Abd Al-Rahman Muhammed Aref came to power., Dr. Nizamettin Arif, a Turkmen 
was appointed to the position of the Minister of Economy and Commerce as 
deputy.110 
 
2.3.3 The Baas Period (1968-1991) 
Baasists who were supported by the top ranking generals close to the BAAS 
doctrine came to power in Iraq through a coup on July 17, 1968.111 Ahmad Hasan al-
Bakr was appointed to the position of Prime Minister and head of the Supreme 
Council of Revolution. Saddam Hussein, who would come to power by 1979, was 
appointed to the position of the deputy chief of the Council as the second man of the 
revolution, and he was made responsible for internal security.  
The BAAS Party whose full name is Arabian Socialist BAAS party or 
Arabian Socialist Rebirth Party was founded by Michael Eflak, a Christian having 
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grown up in the French culture, and by a Muslim, Salah Bitar, in Damascus in 
1943.112 The BAAS doctrine is a kind of Pan-Arab nationalism based on the 
supposition that there is only one Arab nation, and it has been separated artificially 
firstly by the Ottomans and then by Western imperialism and Zionism.113 The BAAS 
Party had an extreme nationalist ideology. One famous ideology of the party was 
assimilation of the minorities. This ideology has been the common strategy for the 
minorities of all Arab parties and fractions in Iraq.114 
 
2.3.3.1 The Iraqi Turkmen in the period of Baas Party 
The coming into power of the BAAS Party with the coup on July 17, 1968 
did not cause disquiet for the Turkmen at first, because no negative developments 
occurred between the Turkmen and Arabs. Both sides were exposed to the influence 
of the Communists at that time. It was expected by the Turkmen that the other ethnic 
settlements developed against them around Kirkuk to be restricted after 1960.115 Yet, 
Baasists seemed to have a strong sense of nationalism and racism, and the BAAS 
party discharged the opposition groups away mercilessly in a short time in order to 
reinforce its authority. Some of those who were opposition to the Baas party were 
arrested, some of them were exiled. Fifty-one persons were executed publicly in 
order to discourage opposition. There was also Nizamettin Arif, who was appointed 
as the Minister of Commerce as deputy, in this group.116 
The Provisional Constitution of Iraq on September 21, 1968 was integrated 
and converted into the 1970 Iraqi Constitution with the government declaration on 
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March 11, 1970, granting the Kurds autonomy. It was defined in the 1970 
constitution that Iraq was composed of two major nationalities, “Arabs and Kurds”. 
The official language was Arabic, and Kurdish language was accepted as the official 
language along with Arabic in Kurdish regions. The Turkmen were neglected in the 
constitutional platform. The structure and attitude of the Iraqi constitutions conflicted 
clearly with articles of the 1932 declaration that allowed the Iraqi Government to join 
the international society.117 
The BAAS party had stated that it would present the minorities in the country 
a package called cultural rights in order to attain their support.118 Surprisingly, these 
rights were only announced after Iraq had implemented the document dated January 
4, 1969, covering the termination of racism and racial segregations of the United 
Nations General Assembly on January 14, 1970.119 
The second one of the documents recognizing the existence of the Turkmen 
in Iraq and entitling them some rights (the first document was the 1932 Declaration) 
was the Order of the Revolution Command Council on January 24, 1970. The order, 
“Cultural Rights of the Turkmen Nationals” was composed of seven articles. The 
first three articles were related to education in the Turkmen language, and comprised  
certain education such that education in the primary schools would be offered in 
Turkmen language, that all the course materials in the schools offering education in 
this language would be in the Turkmen language, and that the Turkmen Education 
Directorate would be founded by the Ministry of Education. The other four articles 
were related to cultural rights and stated that an association of Turkmen poets and 
men of letters would be established, that a weekly newspaper or magazine in the 
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Turkmen language would be published, that the Turkmen Directorate of Culture 
under the Ministry of Culture would be founded, and that the duration of the 
broadcasts in the Turkmen language would be extended.120 
Haradan Al- Tikriti, the former Minister of Defense in Iraq, who was one of 
those that played an important role in the coup in 1968 and who was assassinated by 
the BAAS party, noted in his memoirs published in Libya regarding  rights given to  
minorities, that the Iraqi authority had never been and would never be sincere and 
loyal in respecting these rights.121 
As a matter of fact, the underlying reason why the BAAS regime had not 
included Turkish language in the notice was that they wished to minimize the 
possibility of Turkmen to take advantage of their cultural rights by forcing them to 
accept the old alphabet (the Arab Alphabet). They hoped to segregate the Turkmen 
society from the rest, if they insisted on using the Turkish language in the the Latin 
alphabet. Since then Turkish education in the Arabic Alphabet has been the medium 
of the Turkmen language.  
The notice on January 24, 1970 turned out to be a disappoinment among the 
Turkmen as some of the rights granted would not be implemented, and the rest would 
be restricted. Thus, the BAAS party followed the opportunity on assimilation policy 
in disguise of clear suppression. At first, the practice of the right to education in the 
Turkmen Language was minimized due to the problem with the alphabet. The 
number of the schools that offer education in the Turkmen language was reduced 
through several plays. False petitions were issued on behalf of Turkmen parents, and 
the names of schools in Turkish were replaced with Arabic ones. Fifteen teachers of 
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Turkmen origin were exiled to Kirkuk. The Baghdad government banned the Turkish 
part written in Latin alphabet of the magazine of Qardashlık of the Turkmen 
Brootherhood Associatian. The management of the a weekly political newspaper, 
“Yurt”, and the monthly literary magazine of “Birlik Sesi” which were planned to be 
published by the Association of Turkmen Men of Letters and Turkmen Directorate of 
Culture under the Ministry of Press were granted to those who were in favor of the 
BAAS.122 
Because of these unjust implementations of the government, a boycott 
campaign lasting for 3 days started and some protests were held in Kirkuk. Some 
students boycotted the courses; some people did not go to their workplaces.  Fifty 
Turkmen were arrested and exposed to severe torture in Kirkuk. The BAAS authority 
increased pressures because of the the boycott. Turkmen businessmen were not given 
loans, their relations with the state were obstructed, they were not allowed to work in 
state offices, and the Turkmen graduates of universities were not appointed to the 
Turkmen districts. In 1972 only 500 of 10,000 employees working in the Kirkuk oil 
company were Turkmen.123 
On the other hand, the Baghdad government signed an agreement consisting 
of 15 articles with Kurds regarding their cultural, executive and political rights. This 
agreement were composed of the decisions that the Kurds would be represented in 
the parliament, an autonomous Kurdish territory would be established, a Kurdish 
vice president would be appointed, the domestic income would be shared fairly, and 
the Arabic and Kurdish languages would be accepted as the official languages in the 
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region.124 In accordance with the agreement, Baghdad government did not need to 
win the Turkmen over anymore, because the hostility between the Kurds and 
government forces had been terminated and peace had been guaranteed in the 
north.125 
Pursuant to the agreement between the Baghdad government and Kurds, it 
was required to hold a plebiscite in order to find out the boundaries of the Kurdish 
Autonomous Territory.126 The major challenge in the plebiscite that was planned to 
be held on October 26, 1970 based on the ethnic origin and the native language 
determined the destiny of areas where the Turkmen live intensively. The Turkmen 
had to choose the authority of one of the two sides to govern Turkmen territory and 
could not determine their own rights and freedoms. Thus, the Turkmen who were not 
entitled with the right of autonomy would subordinate themselves to either the Kurds 
or Arabs.127 In this period, within which the conflict between BAAS and Barzani 
increased, bidirectional pressures in Kirkuk also increased. Those who were in favor 
of Barzani entered Kirkuk secretly in groups and settled in the quarters such as 
Mollah Abdullah Mount, Rahimava, Iskan, Sorcha. The Baasists settled 50 thousand  
Arab families in the districts of el-Hürriye, el-Kerama, el-Baas, July 17, Palestine 
and el-Kudus, which were recently built by the government, who provided them birth 
records registered in Kirkuk. They founded front companies (Mukavilin el Arap, 
Dibis Electricity and Kirkuk Oil Company). The Kurds tried to make their authority 
accepted in all Turkmen territories. It was forbidden to speak Turkish especially in 
Arbil, Hanekin and Kifri.  
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The Baghdad government had to postpone the plebiscite to an uncertain date. 
It was not held, since the government could not prevent the Kurds from entering or 
establishing themselves in Kirkuk.128 
Public opinion in Turkey reacted against the Turkmen exposure to 
bidirectional pressure. Insensitive attitude of the Baghdad government on the 
Turkmen issue and denial of Turkmen existence in Iraq were regarded as a political 
matter by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. General Salih Mehdi Ammaş, the Vice 
President of Iraq visited Turkey on January 16, 1971, for one week and the situation 
of the Iraqi Turkmen were discussed in this official visit.129 
The BAAS authority applied all means in order to change the ethnic structure 
of the territories where the Turkmen made up a majority against them. Even local 
authority of the villages was allocated to Arabs as well as in the quarters of the big 
cities. This practice did not change even in the villages where entire residents were 
Turkmen. Incentives were given to settle the Arabs in Turkmen territories. The 
names of the villages in the Turkmen language were changed with Arabic ones.  The 
name of Kirkuk was changed to “Al-Tamim” which meant nationalization in 
accordance with the order of Presidency number 41 of January, 20, 1976.130  In order 
to promote Arab settlement in Kirkuk, the moving expenditures of Arabs were 
compensated; financial support was granted to them; convenient loans for buildings 
were supplied. On the contrary, the purchase of land and building for the Turkmen 
was stipulated to the allowance of the security forces. Especially, the sale of 
immovable property between two Turkmen was forbidden. However, the scale of the 
property of a Turkmen to an Arab was facilitated. An Arab, who married a Turkmen 
girl, was awarded ten thousand Dinars (33 thousands US $). The Baghdad 
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government banned to preach sermons in Turkish publicly in the Turkmen territories, 
and put pressure on the clergy. Thus, people who did not know Arabic were exposed 
to psychological pressure.131 
Turkish President Fahri Koruturk visited Kirkuk on April 27, 1976 during his 
official visit to Iraq. The Turkmen held a unique welcoming ceremony for President 
Koruturk.  After his visit, many Turkmen were arrested and were taken into custody. 
Some new plans were put into effect in order to assimilate the Turkmen. In 1976, 
new regulations enclosing especially the Turkmen territories were carried out 
through the administrative division of the country. The towns of Tuzhurmatu and 
Tavuq which were the important residences of Kirkuk were added to the province of 
Selahaddin, the town of Chamcamal was added to the province of Suleymaniyah, and 
the town of Kifri was added to the province of Diala. Agricultural lands belonging to 
the Turkmen were nationalized. Baghdad authorities took over the social and cultural 
unions, associations and clubs founded by the Turkmen one by one as of 1977. 
Management of chambers, unions and clubs of teachers, doctors and engineers in 
Kirkuk were allocated to Arabs. Meanwhile, the government put pressure on the 
Turkmen Brotherhood Association in Baghdad, whose branch houses were located in 
Mosul and Arbil, and on the administrators who had been elected annually and it 
appointed members of the BAAS party to the management of TBA. With this 
decision, the association lost its function of representing the Turkmen in Iraq.132  
The Turkmen experienced the darkest times of their lives under the dictatorial 
regime that was established when Saddam Husein came into power in 1979.  During 
this period, an awful pressure and assimilation efforts and many human rights 
violations were observed in areas where the Turkmen lived. Applications such as the 
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obligation to take permission for purchasing or saling their own properties, 
nationalizing the lands belonging to the Turkmen, exposure to insults in state offices 
if the Turkmen were using a Turkish name or speaking Turkish, confiscating houses 
belonging to Turkmen by force and settling the Arabs and providing Arab 
settlements in Kirkuk by supplying funds and land by the state were only witnessed 
in the Turkmen territories.133 
Pressures of the BAAS regime on the Turkmen increased intensely in 1979, 
and leaders of the Turkmen were taken into custody and exposed to torture. Among 
those who had been arrested and exposed to torture, were Abdullah Abdurrahman134, 
Dr. Rıza Demirci135, and Adil Şerif, an undertaker. Although they were tortured for 
days, these leaders could not be proven guilty. Eventually, the Baghdad authority 
executed Abdullah Abdurrahman, Necdet Koçak and Adil Şerif on January 16, 1980 
in order to discourage the Turkmen. The execution of these leaders who defended 
most the human rights of the Turkmen society (their unique purpose of which was to 
live decently in Iraq) made the Turkmen people to steer away from the 
government.136 
After this event, the relationships between the Turkmen and the regime 
ceased. The Turkmen neither applied for any official work nor participated in non-
governmental organizations and associations any more. Subsequently, a lot of 
intellectuals, youngsters or craftsmen understanding that it was impossible to live 
under such a regime chose exile.137 
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Mahir Nakip stated that the reason why Saddam had executed three 
Kirkukian Turkmen was to measure Turkey’s reaction about its cognates, and that 
these executions were observed frequently during the Iran-Iraq war lasting for eight 
years upon the insensitivity of Turkey, Hundreds of thousands of Turkmens was 
killed in the front and hundreds were imprisoned.138 
On February 28, 1980, the Turkish Foreign Minister stated as a response to 
questions regarding executions of the Turkmen in Iraq, “We can only present the 
reaction of the Turkish public opinion with our compliments; we have done that, but 
they have not listened to us”.139 
The Saddam regime maintained the policy whereby the Turkmen were 
compelled to abandon their territories and to change the ethnic identity. Their 
villages were destroyed. The Turkmen opposing cruelty and pressures had been 
arrested or executed without any legality.  
 
2.3.3.1.1 The Turkmen in the Iran-Iraq War 
The reasons for the eight year Iran-Iraq war can be explained as follows: The 
Iranian regime threatened the regime in Iraq in 1979; Iran supported the Shiite Iraqi 
people in opposition and Kurdish separatists; Iraq was not content with the 
provisions of the Algeria Agreement in 1975; the Iranian army was weak; Baghdad 
wished to become the leader of the Arab world; Humeyni reflected the uneasiness in 
domestic politics and Iraq intended to possess the Arab Kuzistan Territory.140 
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The war between Iraq and Iran deteriorated the situation in the country and 
the conditions of the Turkmen society became gradually more difficult. The Baghdad 
authority exempted a big part of Kurdish population from military service but sent 
the Turkmen to the frontlines of the battle.141 The Baghdad authority exposed the 
Shiite Turkmen to severe pressures because of the war between Iraq and Iran. A great 
number of Turkmen intellectuals were executed due to incorrect and unjust charges. 
The Iraqi government took advantage of the convenient atmosphere of the battle in 
order to destroy the Turkmen and it maintained its policy of pressure in the 1980 s.142 
The Turkmen were executed in pre-war period upon charges that they had 
been spying for Turkey. During the war the same accusations were made concerning 
Iran and the Turkmen were executed based on the allogations of espionage for Iran.  
Since these projects carried out in order to change the national characteristics 
of Kirkuk did not satisfy the Iraqi authorities, the government with the order on 
October 20, 1981 planned to build 20.000 houses in the province of Amara in the 
south of Iraq in order to force Turkmen families to migrate from Kirkuk. However, 
when the battle between Iran and Iraq continued in favor of Iran, Arabs migrating 
from the province of Basrah had to be settled in those houses built in Amara for the 
Turkmen. The only advantage of the battle between Iran and Iraq has been this for 
the Turkmen that suffered most from the negative aspects of the war.143 
In some Turkmen territories, villages were evacuated in order to build 
military facilities and these villages were destroyed. The evacuated villages were 
filled with Kurds. Two Thousand houses were taken down in order to build a 
highway of a width of 600 meters to reduce the number of Turkmens in Kirkuk. Five 
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hundred more houses were taken down in order to build an international train station 
in the quarter of Tisin and 1000 houses belonging to the Turkmen were confiscated 
in the quarter of New Tisin. In November 1985, a large scale search activity 
including the whole of the Turkmen territories, primarily Kirkuk, were carried out by 
military forces. Assaults were made on Turkmen businessmen and no measures were 
taken against the looting activities of the Arabs settled in Kirkuk.144 
The BAAS authority announced that it would hold a census on October 12, 
1987 with a circular. However, it was understood from the forms issued for the 
census that it would be a plebiscite and an unjust implementation to find out the 
number of Arabs and Kurds. The Turkmen could not expose their own identity. The 
biggest reaction was shown at the protest march and meeting organized by the 
Association of Culture and Mutual Aid of the Iraqi Turkmen in Ankara.  
In 1988, a great number of Turkmen were executed in Telafer, the largest 
Turkmen town in Mosul district.145 The Turkmen were refused a legal identity once      
again through the statement that Iraqi public is composed of Arabs and Kurds in the 
Republican Constitution of Iraq published on July 7, 1990.  
 
2.4 The Turkmen Policy of Turkey (1921-1991) 
According to article 16 of Lausanne Peace Treaty, Turkey undertook not to 
pursue policies over the Ottoman/Turks citizens who had stayed out of the border of 
the newly established Turkey.146 Therefore, Turkey did not consider the issue of 
Turks and relative societies outside its territory. Ankara, who has been loyal to the 
treaties, pacts, lost its authority in Mosul vilayeti with the Ankara Agreement signed 
in 1926. The Turkey’s policy towards Turkmen may be examined in this respect.   
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Turkey’s foreign policy based on not to touch upon certain slippery fields and 
issues147 except for Westernization has been the most important factor for this 
situation, as well as its intentions not to encourage racist approaches and not to 
disturb other countries.148 
Hasan Köni stated that the reason why Turkey had not made any agreement 
about the Turkmen in Iraq in the 1920s can be explained as follows: Iraq committed 
in the notification published while affiliating with the League of Nations with the 
support of the British that the rights of the Turkmen in Iraq would be respected. Köni 
furthermore stated that the Iraqi Turkmen tried to take advantage of social life, 
benefit from the human rights and to acquire economic rights like the other diaspora 
Turks, and Turkey believed that the Turkmen would be granted their wishes in a 
period where the issue of self-determination was given utmost importance.149 
Although the Iraqi Turkmen were not included in the agreements signed 
between Turkey and Iraq in the period between 1921 and 1991, Turkey made several 
attempts on behalf of the Iraqi Turkmen during this period.150  Turkey used 
diplomacy against the unjust policies towards Turkmen in Iraq.  
As from the beginning, the Iraq policy of Turkey has been built on the 
security of both Turkey and Iraq, in particular of the seperatist Kurdish activities.  As 
the beginning of the change of the political conjunture, Turkey began to deal with 
Turkmen issue at the beginning of 1990’s but indeed it was again related with its 
security.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE TURKMEN AFTER GULF WAR II (1991-2003) 
 
 
 
3.1 Gulf War II and the process towards the Safe Region  
In the beginning of the 1990 s, Iraq accused Kuwait for extraction of oil from 
the contraversial Rumeyla Oil zone, and complained about the debt relationship151 
with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Iraq regarded Kuwait as part of Basrah, a 
vilayet of the extince Ottoman Empire.152 In addition, there were other reasons 
pushing Iraq towards the assault on Kuwait such as: the economic and social 
problems caused by the war between Iraq and Iran between 1980 and 1988; Iraq’s 
attempts to increase its military force; Saddam’s desire to become the political leader 
in the Arab world; Iraq’s wish to dispose of internal unsteadiness through external 
political adventure.153 On August 8, 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait and on August 28 
he announced that it had become the 19th province of Iraq.  
The invasion caused huge reactions across the world and the Security Council 
of United Nations (UNSC) asked Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The UNSC adopted  
resolutions numbered 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 669, 670 and 674, between 
August 2 and November 30, 1990.154 In its resolution 678, the SC empowered 
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member states with the authority to use all required means including force if required 
in case Iraq did not withdraw its troops out of Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Iraq did 
not abandon Kuwait despite all these resolutions and negotiations. So Coalition 
Forces composed of 30 countries, under the leadership of USA, acting under UN 
mandate, declared war on Iraq (on January 17, 1991). In the operation called “Desert 
Storm” lasting for 42 days, the Iraqi forces could not resist Coalition forces for long, 
and a ceasefire was declared on February 27.155 Resolutions of the UN had been 
implemented and the invasion of Kuwait ended.  
During the Iraq War in 1991, Turkey supported the Coalition composed of 
Western countries, by opening its lands to the Coalition Forces and allocating its 
bases and facilities to the use of USA and NATO. Turkey also accepted Resolution 
661156 dated August 6, 1990 by the UNSC and decided to impose a commercial 
embargo on Iraq. In the framework of this decision, Turkey completely closed the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipe line, blocked the properties of Iraq and Kuwait and 
postponed its commercial relationships with Iraq and Kuwait.157 
Upon defeat of the Iraqi army, in March 1991 a large insurgency against the 
Iraq regime took place, particularly in the region where Shiite communities lived. 
This insurgency was followed by a Kurdish uprising in Suleymaniyah, in Northern 
Iraq, on March 02, 1991.158 The Baghdad authority suppressed the insurgency by 
using land troops, supported by helicopters. However, approximately 1.500.000 
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Northern Iraqi people, mainly Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians, took refuge in Turkey 
and Iran.159 
The Kurdish situation attracted world attention because of the outrageous 
circumstances of their refugee conditions. Faced with this crisis, Ankara which had 
experienced a similar crisis in 1988, took the lead in initiating Operation Provide 
Comfort.160 
Turkish President Turgut Ozal supported the idea that the best way to help the 
refugees was to establish a buffer zone along the border, and to have them settled on 
the plains in this zone. The idea of establishment of a buffer zone was brought on the 
agenda by the British MP John Myer, at a meeting of The European Community 
(EC) in Brussels. But the proposal of President Ozal was not supported because of 
the fear that a new Gazza Strip would be created. The establishment of a region was 
appropriated that would guarantee refugees to return to their hometowns. As 
following report released by the US Secretary of State, James Baker after his 
investigations on the Turkey-Iraq border and upon recommendations of the EC,   US 
President, George H.W Bush(1989-1993) warned Iraq not to fly over their airplanes,  
not to make military operations above the 36 parallel, and declared the territory as a 
“No-Fly Zone”.  Thus, a different buffer zone from the one proposed by Turkish 
President Ozal occured.161  
In accordance with the UNSC Resolution 688(1991), The first phase of the 
Operation “Provide Comfort” that was limited to help and rescue operations, was 
launched. This Resolution at the same time was the basis of the establishment of  the 
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“No-Fly zone” and “Poised Hammer” Operation.162 Operation “Provide Comfort” I 
(PC I), was carried out by 20.000 soldiers from 11 countries, and supported by the 
Air Force Unit deployed in Turkey at the end of April 1991. After establishment of  
the No-Fly zone, as a consequence of operations, refugues returned to their 
hometowns and only 5000 remained on the Turkish Border by August 1991.163 The 
number of military force decreased,  as a result of the success in operation PC I. The 
Second phase of the operation began under the name “Poised Hammer”(on July 
1991-August 1996). Its force was deployed in Incirlik to  control the “No-Fly zone” 
region and to be a deterrent against the Baghdad regime. The name of the operation 
changed to “Operation Northern Watch164” in January 1997.165 Although Turkey was 
the initiator of this operation, later it lead to the creation of “Kurdish Political 
Authority” in N.Iraq, This bacame one of the most pressing foreign policy and 
security concern to Turkey. 
The reason why Turkey supported  “Poised Hammer”/“Operation Northern 
Watch” was the fact that  these operations were detracted Saddam from attacking 
N.Iraq. The Turkish stance also symbolized cooperation and solidarity of  Turkey 
with the international society on Iraq Issue. At this period, Turkey was carrying out 
operations on N.Iraq against the PKK Terror organization. If Poised 
Hammer/Operation Northern Watch were not supported, Turkey could face  
problems in the international community.166  
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It is obvious that the 36. parallel was not considered while the borders of the 
No Fly zone  were drawn. Kirkuk is below the line of 36. paralel but Mosul is above 
it. In practice, Kirkuk and Mosul were placed under authority of the Baghdad regime. 
Although Suleymaniyah was under the line of 36. parallel, It was left  to the control 
of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan(PUK) lead by Talabani.167  
In the “No-Fly zone”, an authority gap occurred that could not be controlled 
by any country and in which non-governmental organizations and terrorist groups 
were free to act. The seperatist Kurdish  groups  used this vacuum and worked for an 
independent “Kurdish state”, which negatively affected the countries in the region.168 
The Kurdish groups created institutions such as “legislative”, “executive”, 
“judiciary”, and “security forces”.169 The financial resources for institutionalizing of  
the Kurdish groups were met through the Habur Border Gate, oil, illegal income and 
foreign support, until the Iraqi War of 2003.   
• Habur Border Gate: It is estimated that Kurdish groups gain one billion 
US$ per year from trade with Turkey.  Kurdistan Democratic Party(KDP) lead by 
Mesud Barzani, founded the Kurd Oil to serve this purpose.170, Çetin Nuhoğlu, the 
chief of the International Transportation Association(Turkey) asserted that after Gulf 
War II, the border gate system became the most important source of income for 
Kurdish groups, whereby they gained 300 million US $ in permits for the entry of 
Turkish trucks to N.Iraq.171 
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• Oil: With Resolution 986 of the UNSC (14 April 1995)172, 13 % of the 
revenues gained by the sale of oil was allocated to the region.173 This share was 
divided up between KDP and PUK, and these incomes were used for construction of 
infrastructure of N.Iraq. 
• Illegal revenues: Smuggled cigarettes, drug trade and racketeering can be 
counted among the illegal activities which brought revenue. 
• Foreign Contributions: Part of the foreign help coming to the region was 
supplied by NGOs. However, a considerable part was financed by the states which 
wanted to pursue their interests in the region such as US, Britain, France, Japan, and 
Israel.174 
 
3.2 Turkmen between the two Wars (1991-2003) 
While the Turkmen were not being affected by the insurgency against the 
central government, they watched developments with care and worry. An insurgency 
took place on 18 March 1991, which was instigated by the Kurds from the North, 
against the BAAS administration in Kirkuk. Both PUK militia and KDP militia 
entered the Kirkuk city. They invaded the government agencies and buildings on 18 
Mart 1991, and burned the civil registration records, with the aim to destroy data 
regarding Turkmen existence in the region.175 
The Turkmen who did not join the insurgency became victims of military 
units which arrived from Baghdad on 26 March 1991 in Tazehurmatu, and 28 
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Turkmen were killed for no reason.176 Two days later, military units who besieged  
Altunkopru on 28 March 1991, killed approximately one hundred Turkmen without 
any questioning.177  
Massacres which the Baghdad administration instigated against the Turkmen 
caused thousands of Turkmen to migrate to the borders of Turkey and Iran, (at the 
beginning of April 1991); Nearly 17.000 Turkmen reached the Turkish borders, 
under difficult circumstances. Due to the fact that Turkey granted the right of refuge 
to Turkmen and Kurds who escaped from Iraq, nearly 15 thousand Turkmen were 
settled into Şemdinli, Yüksekova, Sivas, Kangal, Kayseri, Güneşli and Halkalı 
regions, and about seven thousand Turkmen had to take refuge in Iran.178 
During the 1991 insurgency, the number of Kurds who escaped to Turkey and 
Iran was nearly 25 or 30 % of the total population. The rate of Turkmen who escaped 
from places where the bloodiest assaults were experienced, primarily Kirkuk, 
Altunkopru and Arbil, did not exceed 1 %.179 
The most important consequence of Gulf War II for the Turkmen was that 
%85-%90 of the Turkmen population were left outside “No-Fly zone”, while the 
north of 36th parallel and the south of 32nd parallel were put under protection and 
thus the Turkmen were actually divided into two.180 
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3.2.1 The Turkmen in the “No-Fly Zone”  
The No-Fly zone which was established within North Iraq included the 
provinces of Suleymaniyah, Arbil and Dohuk. While the Turkmen lived 
predominantly in the Arbil181 region, a few Turkmen families resided in 
Suleymaniyah–Kifri, Dohuk and Zaho regions in the No Fly zone. 
“Parliamentary” elections were held in order to fill the authority gap in the 
newly-established area, on 19 May 1992. KDP received %44.58 of the votes, and 
PUK received % 44.33 of the votes as a result of the elections. Both parties gained 
50 seats out of 105 seats, and the remaining 5 seats were allocated to Assriyans. The 
Turkmen did not participate in this election since there was a condition that “Only 
“Kurdistan” citizens can participate into the election”182 and they were worried that 
the region will secede from the central administration183 Muzaffer Arslan, the 
Secretary General of Iraq National Turkmen Party (INTP) of that period, explained 
another reason why the Turkmen did not participate into the elections by stating; 
We did not participate into the elections, because the problems of Iraq should 
be considered as whole. Benefiting from the temporary opportunities, seeking 
one-sided and partial solutions to the problems shall bring no use and the 
problems of Iraq cannot be solved in this way.184 
 
“Regional Parliament” was established in Arbil following the elections. 
Kurdish parties established a “regional-government” in Arbil on 4, July 1992, with  
17 ministries under the “prime ministery” of Fuat Masum from PUK. The Turkmen 
did not accept the “ministry” which was offered to them in “government” finding it 
inadequate representation for their population.185 
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Draft of a “Constitution” was prepared in the “parliament” in 1992. In the 
fourth article of the draft of “Constitution” which was prepared in Arbil in 1992, the 
existence of the Turkmen was clearly recognized. They were called a minority, 
instead of nation and in the fifth article of the same draft of “Constitution”, Kirkuk 
was proclaimed capital. Soon after, PUK and KDP started a conflict by ending the 
ceasefire between them.186 
 Following the KDP-PUK struggle, PUK became dominant in Arbil in May 
1993, where the Turkmen population was dense and “parliamentary elections” which 
were held were deemed invalid.187 During this period, 11 Turkish primary schools 
and 5 secondary schools were opened by Iraqi National Turkmen Party (INTP) in 
Arbil. Along with the press and broadcasting organizations, a radio and television 
station with broadcasted in Turkish was founded. Radio broadcasting was initiated as 
of 23 May 1993.188  INTP established a security unit, composed of 350 people to 
protect institutions belonging to Turkmen.189 
Upon the invitation of KDP, Saddam’s forces with the KDP militia made a 
raid on Arbil on 31 August 1996. During the raids, which were organized against the 
Turkmen schools, 34 Turkmen were killed or arrested. This issue was registered in 
the report of UN Human Rights Commission (A/51/496/add. 18 November 1996).190 
Saddam’s forces killed several Turkmen leaders, particularly by targeting the 
Turkmen who were carrying out activities in the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). Many 
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houses, workplaces, buildings and structures of foundations belonging to Turkmen 
were assaulted.191 
As a result of 1996 Arbil raid, PUK was cleansed from Arbil. While PUK 
were settling into Suleymaniyah region, KDP became dominant in Arbil and Dohuk 
regions. Parties established their own administrations in both of the regions”.192 
KDP wanted all of the political parties within the region to be kept under its 
control and command, and did not recognize the existence and political rights of the 
Turkmen.193 Furthermore, Turkmen were occasionally regarded as an obstacle which 
could prevent the Kurdish project.194 Serious steps taken for the foundation of the 
actual “Kurdish state” gave hope to Kurdish groups, and political attempts of the 
Turkmen which were regarded to prevent a prospective “Kurdish state” were 
destroyed even before being formed. The policies which local forces pursued to 
pacifize the Turkmen can be described under four headings; 
• Local forces portrayed the Turkmen as separatists and as a “trojan horse” of 
foreign forces, and requested the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) to get out of the Arbil 
city.195 
KDP claimed that Turkey exerted pressure on the regional government via 
the Turkmen in the north of Iraq, and that Turkmen were exploited by Turkey. It 
further argued that Turkey, in order to prevent progress in N.Iraq, which Kurdish 
parties call the democratic experience, Turkey used the Turkmen to prevent this.196 
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• In order to implement their policies, Local Forces established puppet 
parties. 
In order to disintegrate the Turkmen political movement, Local Forces 
established puppet parties such as Turkmen Brotherhood Party, Turkmen Unity 
Party, Kurdistan Turkmen Cultural Society, Turkmen Liberation Party, Turkmen 
Liberal Democratic Community, Turkmen People’s Party, Turkmen Naissance Party 
and they financed them.197 Bilal Şimşir stated that these kind of parties reminded of 
associations established by Great Britain in Turkey between 1918 and 1922, and that 
he pointed that this kind of structuring in Northern Iraq may be the work of British 
and American organizations.198 Erşat Hürmüzlü stated that imitations of these 
political organizations that have no sympathizers and members other than their 
president had been treated with smiles, but they cast a shadow on Turkmen political 
activities.199 
• Local Forces desired to disperse the organization around Iraqi Turkmen 
Front (ITF) by having raids and assaulting. 
KDP militia attacked with gunfire 16 institutions, organizations and offices 
belonging to the ITF on 10-11 August 1998. They were invaded and looted by the 
public. Furthermore, 86 Turkmen security guards were arrested.200 The assault in 
1998 affected the Turkmen movement in a negative way whose political power had 
been increasing from 1996. This event had a remarkable impact on Turkmen society. 
They believed that racist movements against them shall occur later, considering that 
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they are weak in terms of geography, organization, and logistics. This situation 
created an adverse effect in a period when the Turkmen should have been more 
organized.201 
On 11-12 July 2000, KDP militia attacked the ITF building whereby two 
security guards were killed, and four Turkmen were seriously injured. The event 
caused indignation in Turkmen community. These attacks, which were repeated 
every two years, show how right the Turkmen were for not trusting the regional 
“administration” in Northern Iraq.202 Soon after, ITF documented every attack on 
Turkmen and made them public with reports.203 
• Local forces manipulated the public by using the media. 
The local forces made phychological war against the Turkmen by using 
printed and visual press as a tool. KDP succeeded in creating feelings of hatred 
among the Kurds in N. Iraq against Turkey.204 
Şemsettin Küzeci in his book entitled Kirkuk Genocides portrayed the 
pressures exerted on the Turkmen in the “No-Fly zone” in a comprehensive 
framework, as political pressures, pressures on education,  pressures in social and 
economic fields and the attacks made on the Turkmen.205 
Since the number of the Turkmen in the “No-Fly zone” did not exceed 250-
300 thousand, they could not show a serious political presence among 3.5 million 
Kurdish people. KDP found that the Turkmen somehow joined and Turkish Units, 
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which were deployed for combat against PKK in Northern Iraq, while on the road to 
independence and this situation extremely disturbed KDP.206 
The Turkmen found a partial chance to develop themselves in political and 
administrative terms in the “No-Fly zone”207. However they were barely able to 
introduce themselves to the Arab world and the international community in terms of 
their policy.208 
As a consequence of the attacks in USA on 11 September 2001, Iraq became 
the next target, after Afghanistan. A rapid convergence between the two Kurdish 
groups was observed. Kurdish groups which had old antagonishis accepted the 1992 
“election results”. They re-established the joint parliament. Another issue was that 
KDP became more severe and tough towards the Turkmen and it has 
uncompromising attitudes on the subject of Kirkuk.209 
 
3.2.1.1 Political Struggles of Turkmen  
The Turkmen made use of peaceful methods in their political struggles, and 
they followed policies which reject gunfight. Organizations which are known for 
their cultural and economic aspects became popular among the Turkmen. The main 
reasons of this are that most of the Turkmen are from the educated, intellectual and 
elite class, and that the geography where they reside and the political environment 
are not appropriate to gunfight.210 
Due to the deep pain of the 1959 Kirkuk massacre, organizational activities 
started to appear among the Turkmen. Young Turkmen, who were studying in 
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Turkey, founded the “Iraqi Turks Cultural and Solidarity Association” on October 
1959 which was their first cultural and social organization.211 
“Turkmen Brotherhood Association” was established in Baghdad in 1960. 
Student unions, tradesmen organizations, teachers’ organizations and youth 
movements were linked to them.212 
Increase of prosperity and considerable increase in the number of students 
coming to Turkey made an important contribution to the development of the 
Turkmen political movement in the 1970s. The Baas Party in 1978 prohibited 
Turkmen students to continue their education in Turkey. The Iraqi regime 
encouraged them to go to The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.213  
Iraqi National Democratic Turkmen Organization was founded on 8 August 
1980. This organization joined the Iraqi National Democratic Front as a member. 
The organization was the first political organization which was declared by the Iraqi 
Turkmen. All the political organizations of Iraq convened for the first time in a 
meeting in 1983. In a conclusion statement, the rights of Turkmen were recognized 
by the insistent attitudes of this Turkmen organization. The organization ended its 
activities since the political conjuncture changed.214 
 Iraqi National Turkmen Party (INTP) was founded in 1988 but openly 
declared itself only after Iraq invaded Kuwait, due to the repressive Baghdad regime. 
As a consequence of the experienced administrators of INTP, the world became 
aware of Turkmen existence. Administrators of INTP participated in opposition 
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meetings, which were held in Riyad, Beirut, London and Washington.215 In addition, 
they represented the Turkmen in the important spheres like European Parliament.216 
 The first meeting of Iraq National Congress217 (INC) was held in Vienna on 
17 June 1992, and the second in the town of Selahaddin in N.Iraq, October of the 
same year. INTP and the independent Turkmen representatives participated in these 
meetings. Only one Turkmen was included into the executive boards which were 
composed of 17 for first meeting and 26 later, by taking 6 per cent of the Turkmen 
population as a basis. The Turkmen were not included into tripartite presidency 
system which was composed of a Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite Arab profile.218 
New parties and organizations were established since the region became more 
stable for The Turkmen in N.Iraq. Permissive environment for the Turkmen activities 
encouraged many people to be politically active. Therefore, the INTP did not remain 
the only political party. With a view of collecting the Turkmen parties and the 
organizations under one roof, activities creatie on Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) were 
initiated in October 1994.219 The ITF was established on 24 April 1995 by the 
composition of the INTP, Turkmen Unity Party220 and Turkmen Independence 
Movement (TIM).221 
The first administration of ITF took office by appointment. In order to form 
the Turkmen political movement (which came to the point of disintegration with the 
Arbil raids of 31 August 1996), into a whole once again, and to ensure unity, a new 
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agreement protocol was signed between the Turkmen party and organizations on 5 
February 1997. This protocol played an important role for the reintegration of the 
Turkmen who were about to be disintegrated, and became the starting point of the 
road to the Turkmen General Assembly.  
“First Turkmen General Assembly” was held in Arbil on 4-7 October 1997. 
Representatives of the Turkmen foundations in Europe, USA, Canada and Australia 
participated into the General Assembly. The General Assembly was held by the main 
organizations of the Turkmen, Iraqi National Turkmen Party (INTP), Turkmeneli 
Party (TP), Turkmen Independence Movement (TIM), Turkmen Brotherhood 
Association (TBA), Turkmeneli Cooperation Culture Foundation, Culture and 
Assistance Foundation of Iraqi Turks. In the General Assembly, the ordinance of the 
ITF was accepted. The Turkmen Council, composed of 30 people, was elected. The 
president of the ITF and members of the executive board were elected by the 
Turkmen Council. President of the ITF and the members of the executive board were 
elected by the composition of  representatives of INTP, TP, TIM, TBA.222 
ITF, which included four parties,223 was organized into “Political and Foreign 
Affairs”, “Health, Social and Assistance”, “Information, Education and Culture”, 
“Research and Planning” and “Security Departments”.224 
Dual containment policy of US in 1998225 was replaced with the policy of 
overthrowing the Saddam regime. US found appropriate that a comprehensive and 
new study ground should be started in terms of the Iraqi opposition groups. 
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Therefore, KDP and PUK were made to sign a peace agreement in Washington in 
September of 1998. Later, within the framework of the same studies, the “Act on 
Saving Iraq” was put into effect on 20 January 1999, and Washington contacted the 
seven Iraqi opposition groups. These contacts aimed at cooperation towards 
overthrowing the Saddam Rejime and establishing a democratic administration based 
on the human rights.226 In accordance with the “Act on Saving Iraq,” there was no 
legal Turkmen organization or representative present among the seven opposition 
groups. The fact that there was no legal Turkmen organization in such an act 
reflected Washington’s view towards the Turkmen existence in Iraq.227 
Second General Assembly of ITF228 convened in Arbil on 20-22 November 
2000.229 The Turkmen representatives supported the opinion that a unitarian Iraqi 
state should be restructured, in which there should be no discrimination against races, 
languages, religions and sects and which should be pluralist, democratic, 
parliamentarian and respectful of the human rights.230 
Apart from ITF, the parties such as Iraqi Turkmen Islamic Union which was 
founded in Damascus and lead by Abbas Beyatlı, the Iraqi Turkmen Islamic 
Movement which was founded in Damascus and lead by Dr Sami Muhammet and 
Turkmen Loyalty Movement which was founded in Tehran in 2001 were most 
influential during this period.231 
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Iraqi opposition groups held a meeting on 14-16 December 2002, when the 
war against Iraq was finalized. In this meeting, Iraq was defined as the country of the 
Arabs, Kurds and others. The fact that the Turkmen which are the third largest ethnic 
group in Iraq, were counted as equivalent to the few Assyrians meant that they were 
politically eliminated.232  
The destiny of Iraq after Saddam was discussed in the Iraqi Opposition 
meeting held in Selahaddin, Northern Iraq, in February 2003. The Turkmen were not 
included in the composition of the administration, which was established by six 
people. KDP officials who hosted the opposition meeting maintained their negative 
attitude towards the Iraqi Turkmen in this meeting. KDP officials claimed small 
numbers for the Turkmen population which cannot be taken into consideration. 
Therefore, the Turkmen which are the third largest ethnic population in Iraq and 
second in Northern Iraq were left aside once more. Although several political 
discussions and disputes took place among Turkmen, ideological differences never 
escalated into a gunfight among them.233 
 
3.2.2 The Turkmen under the Baas Regime (1991-2003) 
Eighty five or nighty percent of the Turkmen population was to live and be 
exposed to pressure and cruelty, which the BAAS party adopted as a state policy 
after Gulf war II.234 
An embargo was applied to Iraq after Gulf War II. The Turkmen were also 
affected as well as the other Iraqi people, and they had hunger, disease, poverty, 
unemployment and despair due to the embargo. All the heavy political pressures and 
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bad economic conditions forced the Turkmen to migrate. The number of Turkmen 
who migrated to Turkey, Europe and America increased235 
 The first stop of Turkmen’s migration route, which mostly resulted in death 
and misery, was Turkey. However the laws enforced in Turkey prevented the 
Turkmen to settle in Turkey. Those coming to Turkey by various means were 
expelled. They were made to travel under dire circumstances by being deceived with 
the promise of different criminal networks to take them to European countries 
through Greece in exchange for great amounts of money.236 
Izzeddın Kerkuk237 in his article tried to answer why the Turkmen were 
treated with rudeness and cruelty although they had always been loyal to their state. 
In fact they were treated as if they had been second or even third class citizens. 
Kerkuk reached the folowing conclusions:  
• All of the governments who were in power, had always looked at the 
Turkmen with suspicion and saw them as a potential danger even though they 
officially mentioned friendship towards Turkey.  
•  Kerkuk pointed out that the ideology of the BAAS party which was 
founded on hostile ideology against Turks became effective during this process.  In 
addition, the fact that the region was under Turkish rule for long years caused an 
inferiority complex.238 
Suphi Saatçi, in his article, stated that the inhuman pressure applied to the 
Turkmen with the material and moral threats and tricks by the Iraqi government with 
its full power to assimilate them for 30-35 years yielded no concrete result. On the 
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contrary, the cruelty and the injustice applied to the Turkmen by the Baghdad 
administration accentuated the national awareness and identity of the Turkmen.239 
 
3.3. The Turkmen Policy of Turkey (1991-2003) 
While the no-fly zone was being constructed in 1991, exclusion of Kirkuk 
was a strategic preference for Turkey. The underlying reasons why Turkey preferred 
Kirkuk to be excluded from this region are, 
• Kirkuk oil feeds N.Iraq in economic terms. 
•    The security concerns steming from the possibility of creation of 
Kurdish autonomy in N.Iraq.240 
              However as a natural result of this preference, a strong Turkmen opposition 
could not be organized in Kirkuk. As a result, strength of the Iraqi Turkmen 
remained limited only to Arbil and a few settlement centers.241 
Before examining the Turkey’s Turkmen policy, it is appropriate to state that 
Iraqi policy of Turkey between 1991-2003 concentrated on four dimensions; 
relations with KDP and PUK, the PKK factor,242 relations with Baghdad and the 
status of the Turkmen. During this period, while Turkey was trying to keep PUK and 
KDP under control, it also dealt with preventing PKK terrorism. Apart from this, 
Turkey tried to develop its relations with Baghdad and defended the territorial 
integrity of Iraq.243  Turhan Ketene evaluated the priorities of Turkey’s policies for 
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Iraq, in the following terms; firstly, the PKK issue, secondly  Iraqi Kurds, thirdly 
economic relations concerning Iraq,  fourthly, the issue of Iraqi Turkmen, fifthly the 
others which were covered  by Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Assyrians, Syrians and the 
Yezidis. Ketene furthermore pointed that Turkey considered its first two priorities 
while was leaving the other issues behind, and did not take them seriously.244 
The basic factors determining Turkey’s policy for Northern Iraq has been 
security concerns in the context of PKK activities. In this regard, a security 
agreement was signed between Turkey and KDP, and Turkey extended the first 
assistance package of 13 million dollars, and 12 million dollars later, in the fall of 
1993. More important than this, border trade of 200 million US$ per year was 
established. These revenues became a life line for Kurdish groups until “The Oil for 
food” program was initiated.245 Priority sequence of Turkey’s policies for Iraq was 
determined by its foreign policy trends. Official Turkish pasaports were given to 
Barzani and Talabani, and offices were opened for them in Ankara.246 Furthermore, 
as it was mentioned in previous chapters, revenues of Habur Border Gate supported 
the region in economic terms. Turkey beside USA played an important role of 
mediation in the disputes247 between the Kurdish groups.248 
Turkey tried to formulate policies towards the Turkmen after the Gulf War, 
by taking into consideration the USA, Iraq regime, PKK and even other regional 
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forces.249 Although attention of Turkey towards the Turkmen from 1991 to 1996 
increased, activities remained limited. They focused on areas of education and 
culture in general, and food assistance from Kızılay. Turkey, which has been 
insistent over the territorial integrity of Iraq, put forward this basic approach in all of 
its policies towards the Turkmen; which prevented the Turkmen to become a serious 
military and political power.250  
Establishment of the ITF (24 April 1995) constituted an important step in 
Turkey’s policy for the Turkmen. This marked the transition from social support to 
political support for the Turkmen, by Ankara.251 
One of the most important results of the 1996 Arbil raid was Turkey’s 
bringing the Turkmen, more into the foreground. The dilemma of Turkey up until 
then was: if obvious support was provided to the Turkmen, would Saddam not be 
incited against these people? If the Turkmen were not supported, would these people 
still exist? Turkey seemed to have solved this dilemma then, it shall support the 
Turkmen whatever happens.252  
 Turkey accepted the situation of N. Iraq as a short-lived arrangement that 
would end until the Baghdad administration re-established its authority there. Turkey 
cooperated with Baghdad within the framework of diplomatic initiatives towards 
Northern Iraq in 1996.253 During this period, Turkish foreign policy on Iraq created a 
paradox in itself by pursing policy of supporting of the Turkmen and supporting 
Saddam at the same time. 
                                                 
249 Mazin Hasan, “Türkiye’nin Türkmen Politikası:Yapılması Gerekenler-The Turkmen Policy of 
Turkmen:Needs to be Done”, Stratejik Analiz, (April 2003), p.27.  
250 Hasan Yılmaz, “Irak’ın Gizlenen Gerçeği:Türkmenler-The concealed reality of Iraq:Turkmen”,  
Stratejik Analiz, (May 2003), p.32. 
251 Erşat Hürmüzlü, “Türkmenler Irak Vatandaşlığı ve Federal Çözüm-Turkmen, Iraqi citizenship and 
Federal solution”, Kardaşlık, (October-December 2002), p.3. 
252 Baskın Oran, op.cit., p.226-239. 
253 Mustafa Kayar, op.cit., pp.324-326. 
 
 68 
A meeting was held in Ankara in order to make the ceasefire between KDP 
and PUK, on 30-31 October 1996 with the participation of the Turkish, American, 
British, KDP, PUK and Turkmen officials. Thus, the Dublin process254 was actually 
moved to Ankara and it became the Ankara process. The Turkmen, who had had no 
seat in the previous meetings, came to be a direct party to participate in the 
negotiations with the policy changes of Turkey on this issue. The place of the 
Turkmen in Northern Iraqi equation was officially proven and registered from then 
on.255 At the end of the meeting, it was decided to establish of Peace Monitoring 
Force (PMF)256 which would have a headquarters in Arbil to maintain and monitor 
peace between KDP and PUK.257 
These kinds of developments created the impression that Turkey, at a later 
period, started to perceive the Turkmen as a strategic factor after the Gulf War II in 
1990. The status of the Iraqi Turkmen which was not brought to the foreground at the 
beginning enabled Turkey to find a new way through its efforts to find new political 
means. The problem of the Turkmen was brought to the foreground because of 
Turkey’s new strategic perceptions.258  
During this period, Turkey wanted to open a second border gate in Ovaköy259 
in order to develop the Turkmen region, and make direct contact with the Arabs. 
However this had been prevented by US. Even after the Iraqi war of 2003, this 
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border gate could not be opened as of May 2005 on account of the objections of 
KDP.260 
The pressures which were applied by KDP on the Turkmen in N.Iraq, created 
a problem between Turkey and KDP. Even though KDP declared that it shall meet 
the requests of Turkey concerning Turkmen, it did not keep its promise. Moreover, 
KDP wanted to close the Turkmen schools in the region, However it could not close 
them down because of Turkey’s opposition. 
Prior to the Iraqi war, Iraqi opposition groups had meetings in Ankara on 19 
March 2003. The Ankara declaration that was agreed upon in the last Ankara 
meeting where the American and Turkish officials participated, offered a good 
framework for the position of Turkmen. The document observe the rights of the 
Turkmen, however it was not applied exactly in practice.261 Meanwhile, international 
conjuncture was to change rapidly while narrow ethnic concerns became a priority 
for the USA as long as those ethnicities served Washington’s purpose. The Turkmen 
were not one of those. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE TURKMEN AFTER THE IRAQI WAR OF 2003 (2003-2005) 
 
 
 
4.1 Iraqi War of 2003  
Subsequent 11/9, within the combat with terrorism, following of the 
Afganistan operation, US declared war against Iraq on 19 March 2003, with a view 
to liberalizing Iraq, dethroning Saddam and disposing the weapons of mass 
destruction. After 21 days from the start of the operation, on 9 April 2003, Baghdad 
fell. Baas regime came to an end, and G. W. Bush stated that the main fights ended 
from the American Warship on 1 May 2003, and declared victory. However, today in 
May 2005, increasing number of resistance movements are still going on in Iraq. It 
was reported that civilians between 21.523 and 24.415 and 1609 American soldiers 
1231 of which to be in the fights and the Iraqi soldiers between 4895 and 6370 were 
killed by May 2005.262  
 
4.2 The Turkmen after 2003 Iraqi War  
After the Iraqi War of 2003, the Turkmen reunited with their cognates in the 
north and the south. They were happy to be saved from an oppressor, Saddam 
Husein, after 25 years and to learn that the USA invaded Iraq with the promise of 
bringing democracy. However, the experiences undergone for past two years created 
disappointment. 
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The US forces opened a Northern Front with the help of Kurdish groups and 
within 21 days Baghdad fell. Afterwards, Kirkuk fell on 10 April 2003, and Mosul 
fell on 11 April 2003. The Coalition forces overlooked the Peshmergas looted 
weapons remaining from the ex-Iraqi army in both provinces. The Kurdish groups 
burned the buildings of the Deed and Cadastre in an organized manner particularly in 
Kirkuk, destroyed the documents, and appointed officials to government agencies 
and changed the Arabic letters into Kurdish and to occupied Kirkuk.263 
Provincial councils were established in every province within the framework 
of administrative restructuring, however the Turkmen were granted lower 
representation rights. For instance, in Kirkuk where the Turkmen population is 
dense, US officials followed a pro-Kurdish policy against the Arabs and the Turkmen 
during the establishment of the provincial council. US Forces allocated 6 seats for 
each ethnic group264, and appointed five Kurdish independent officials for another 
six seats, and three of the seats allocated to the Turkmen were provided to puppet 
parties.265 
The US and PUK peshmerga forces carried out an operation against the 
Turkish Liasion Team Office in Suleymaniyah on 4 July 2003 and 11 Turkish 
soldiers were taken hostage as a consequence of the Suleymaniyah raid. They were 
first taken to Kirkuk. One of the most important reasons of this was to demoralize the 
Turkmen by putting pressure signifying that Turkish officers were too weak even in 
protecting their own, let alone the Turkmen. In the same operation, Suleymaniyah 
branch of ITF was raided and the Turkmen were arrested. With these raids, 
                                                 
263 Current Affairs, “A hotbed of Ethnic Tension”, The Middle East, December 2003, p.13. 
264 Kirkuk Province Council was established from 30 seats, 6 for Turkmen, 6 for Kurds, 6 Seats for 
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265 Ibid, p.14. 
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Washington created the impression that it regards the ITF as the 5th column of 
Turkey.266 
Iraqi Governing Council, with 25 members was established by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) on 13 July 2003. Even though party leaders or 
representatives of the other groups were included into the Governing Council, no one 
is included from the ITF which is the official organization of Turkmen. Songül 
Çabuk267 was appointed to the one quota granted to the Turkmen; however they were 
not represented in proportion to the Turkmen population.268 
After the Iraqi war of 2003, the head office of ITF was moved from Arbil to 
Kirkuk, the Turkmen dealt with political reorganization. Regarding this issue, M. 
Kemal Yayçılı stated that; 
Many of our parties and organizations spend most of their time for internal 
structuring. Logistics support which is required within the society has major 
defects and problems. Our parties have still not surmounted these problems.269 
 
The 3rd Turkmen General Assembly270 was held between 13 and 15 
September 2003 in Kirkuk, with 550 delegates. During the Assembly, issues 
concerning Iraq and Turkmen were discussed.  This Assembly consolidated unity 
under the common political discourse in line with the targets of the Turkmen public 
and resolved to accelerate the political movement.271 The participants of the General 
Assembly stressed that they remain loyal to the territorial integrity and political unity 
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of Iraq and any plan or idea that can threaten this unity shall destroy Iraq and Middle 
East, thus spoil world stability. At the end of the general assembly, the consensus 
reached was that: “The participants reject the concepts of majority and minority since 
the all of the peoples living in Iraq are citizens who enjoy equal rights. Territorial or 
political dominance of any group, meaning social segmentation shall in no way be 
accepted, and in this context, compulsory demographic and social exchanges which 
were invented by the autocratic regimes are invalid.”  
“Designated Interim Government” was established by CPA on 1 September 
2003.  Dr. Rashad Mandan was appointed as the minister of science and technology, 
for one chair allocated to the Turkmen out of 25 seats. However, ITF was not 
consulted for this appointment. Dr. Rashad Mandan was appointed for the second 
time, among 33 members for a second term “Designated Interim Government” on 
June 2004 to the cabinet which was established by the elected parliament in May, 
2005. Moreover, the “Governing Council” was terminated on 1 June.272 
The Turkmen were worried since they were not entitled to have seats either in 
the Interim Governing Council and Interim Administration according to their 
population rate and US did not consult their political parties for the appointment to 
the limited allocated seats for Turkmen.  
Discrimination applied to the Turkmen and the indifference of the coalition 
powers lead them to believe in that: “Well, we could not  express ourselves during  
Saddam’s reign, there was cotton in our mouths (we were restricted) but you came 
you removed this cotton out of our mouths, now we can speak but you never listen to 
us as you put that cotton back into your ears.”273 
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During the period when the “Interim Constitution” was being discussed, the 
Turkmen defended the 18-province Iraqi project; the most important reason was that 
it was impossible for the Turkmen to establish autonomy or an ethnic federation 
under the current circumstances and they objected to the federation ideas because 
Turkmeneli which is their own territory should not be shared by other ethnic 
groups.274 
The “Interim Constitution” which was put into effect on 8 March 2004 would 
be valid until the elected council took office and prepared the permanent 
Constitution, and this Constitution is composed of 60 articles under 9 titles. When it 
is considered in terms of the Turkmen position, they were not regarded as the third 
original component. In article 9, only Arabic and the Kurdish were adopted as the 
official language, and the Turkmen are given the right to provide education in their 
own language. According to article 53, while any three provinces outside the Kurdish 
administration can form their own region, Kirkuk and Baghdad are excluded. 
Administrative, cultural and political rights of the Turkmen were guaranteed by 
paragraph d of article 53. Pursuant to article 58/A 1-2-3-4 and article 58/B of the 
interim Constitution, after repatriation of those who were made to migrate from 
Kirkuk in the past and the disputes of immovable properties were settled, and at the 
end of a transparent census which carried out under the umbrella of a permanent 
constitution, the status of Kirkuk shall be solved.275M. Kemal Yaycılı276, President of 
INTP, observed that: 
The Turkmen are not happy with the new constitution. They want more rights 
in their own region. Even though the current laws allow them to arrange their 
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education in Turkish, we request Turkish which is our mother tongue to be 
accepted as the official language in every part of Iraq. We are seeking equality 
among all of the nations and segments of people. One particular right which is 
granted to anyone should also be given to the other.277 
 
In May, 2004, the Turkmen organized a meeting “Turkmen Democracy Unity 
Platform”. Shiite and Sunni representatives of the Turkmen and the clergy 
participated in the meeting. The Turkmen declared that they do not want to be 
ostracized in the reconstruction process of Iraq, and want to be a founding member in 
the constitution.278  
One of the most important events for the Turkmen was that, in September, 
2004 prior to the November 2004 census279, the Telafer region became a scene of 
joint operations of Kurdish militia and the US forces. Thousands of Turkmen became 
homeless. Strategy experts in Turkey interpreted the Telafer operations as one stage 
in creating the Western leg of the “Great Kurdistan” dream and it was regarded as a 
rehearsal of The Kirkuk massacre.280 Such operations in Telafer still go on in May 
2005. 
US officials allowed the Kurdish planned migration to the Kirkuk region, 
which started in April 2003 and the migration rates increased towards the January 
elections. The number of Kurdish people taken to Kirkuk by the KDP and PUK 
reached  350.000. The aim is to include the region to the Kurdish autonomous region 
by changing its demographic structure.281 
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It is not adequate to explain the negative attitudes of Coalition forces towards 
the Turkmen and following pro-Kurdish policies, with the fact that 1 March 
Resolution was rejected in Turkey. The resistance in Iraq has been increasingly 
continuing since US President George W. Bush declared that the war ended in May 
2003. The Coalition Forces have not encountered any resistance in KDP and PUK 
regions except for a few events. Coalition Forces opened the Northern Front with 
KDP and PUK.  Moreover, Northern Iraq and Kurdish policies of the US and Israel 
extend back to the 1960s. It is particularly important to examine the importance 
which they attach to the Kurds among the Iraqi opposition groups in the period 
starting from the end of 1990 to the year 2003 and their pro-Kurdish Jewish policies 
in the region.282 A Kurdish Development Bank283  was founded in Suleymaniyah 
with Jewish capital after the war. The Bank granted attractive loans to the Kurds and 
enabled them to purchase land and houses for exorbitant prices in the Mosul and 
Kirkuk regions. It is also useful to indicate this point: The West has sympathy 
towards Kurdish groups on the basis of the historical developments and due to the 
activities of the Kurdish lobby groups in USA, Israel and Europe. Another important 
point is US, who knows that any privileges to be granted to the Turkmen shall be in 
favor of Turkey in the short term, It  does not want to take such a risk in the long 
term.284 
The Turkmen participated in the parliament and local elections on 30 January 
2005 with three organizations as ITF, Turkmen National Movement, and Joint Iraqi 
Alliance for the Shiite Turkmen through a quota for the Shiite list. Furthermore, the 
Turkmen parties which were previously mentioned were specified as nominees from 
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the Kurdish list.285 The Turkmen considered whether to participate into the election 
or not as a consequence of the irregularities which were made in Kirkuk before the 
election lists were prepared. But, they decided to participate in order not to be 
detached from the political arena. 
At the end of the election, ITF received 73791 votes. Thus, ITF could get 3 
deputies in the Iraqi parliament, which has 275 seats, 5 Turkmen out of 141 deputies 
from the Joint Alliance of the Shiites, 1 Turkmen from the Allavi list and 4 Turkmen 
from the Kurdish alliance.286  The Kurdish list received 58.4 % of the votes and the 
Turkmen 16 % and got 9 out of 41 seats for province council in Kirkuk.287 
Sedat Ergin explained the reasons for the lack of votes given to the Turkmen 
in terms of irregularities made by the Kurdish groups, particularly in Kirkuk and 
Turkmen regions288. He also refered to the fact that participation in the provinces 
where the Turkmen population is dense was lower, and ITF performed 
unsuccessfully.289 Moreover, the reasons why the Turkmen were passive in the 
elections can be linked with the effectiveness of the resistance movements in the 
Turkmen regions, security problems and unrest.290 
Pursuant to the “Interim Constitution”, the Elected National Assembly shall 
prepare draft Constitution until 15 August 2005, and this draft shall be submitted to a 
plebiscite on 15 October 2005. If it shall not be rejected by a two-thirds majority in at 
least three of the 18 provinces, the fate of the constitution shall be determined against 
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a simple majority criterion. If the result of the plebiscite for the constitution is yes, 
general elections shall be held on 15 December 2005, and the new government shall 
be established at the end of the year. And if the constitution will be rejected the 
national council shall be terminated and, new elections shall be held on 15 
December.291 
Faruk Abdullah Abdurrahman, president of ITF (2003-June 2005), went to 
Necef and visited Ayetullah Sistani, the spiritual leader of Shiites, after the election. 
His visit was interpreted as the formation of the ITF-Shiite alliance, and comments 
were made that an agreement was made over Kirkuk.292 The fact that one third of the 
Turkmen are Shiite inevitably facilitates these kinds of alliances, and it can be 
evaluated as an advantage in a region like Iraq where alliances are important. 
After the election, the Turkmen held new Turkmen General Assembly in 
Kirkuk, on 22-24 April 2005, and evaluated the results of elections. Some Turkmen 
even thought that ITF remained a little clumsy when faced with developments in 
Baghdad and stressed the necessity of a restruction process. As a consequence of the 
disputes that arose in the General Assembly where arguments about the regulations 
of ITF, presidential elections were postponed. It is possible to regard this situation as 
normal in Iraq because it has a limited two years of experience in democracy. 
In the reconstructing process of Iraq, even though the Turkmen were 
ostracized in political terms, the Turkmen claim that their situation is better 
compared to the previous periods. Regarding this issue, Turhan Ketene stated that;  
The Turkmen issue is considered to be very bad, but if you ask my opinion, the 
Turkmen issue is in its best status because we can act as we like. We can reach 
all of the Turkmen regions. If any one of you wishes to go to there, you can do 
and transmit your message you want. You can deliver any assistance you would 
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like. We had never found a better opportunity, in other words we have not had 
since the Ottoman period.293 
 
During this period, Turkmeneli TV, which can provide satellite broadcasting 
from Kirkuk, started broadcasting. Some of the foreign TV channels broadcast news 
by giving reference to Turkmeneli TV. Turkish courses started in the Turkmeneli 
region under restricted conditions after the war, and the medium of instruction 
became Turkish.294 
The focal point of the discussions after the Iraqi war of 2003 was to review to 
what extent the political struggle in a geography like Iraq became successful. The 
views of Ekrem Pamukçu, a member of the Iraqi Turkmen Council, are as follows;  
One of the most important flaws of the Turkmen is that they cannot bear the 
weapon and the pen at the same time. To survive and have an authority in such 
a country like Iraq whose structure and order can change at any time, this 
capability is essential at least to be able to defend itself. As a matter of fact, 
becoming loyal and making oneself amiable to the current governments did not 
bring any benefit to the Turkmen, on the contrary they were treated with 
cruelty, remained vulnerable to massacres and their leaders were liquidated, 
and many of them were executed. Another mistake of the Turkmen is that they 
always make their policies in terms of their internal affairs. And this caused 
conflicts and disagreements and deprived the people of leadership which shall 
defend them.295 
 
 
4.3 The Kirkuk Issue  
The city of Kirkuk296 is the most important settlement area of the Turkmen as 
well as a symbol. The name Kirkuk, which was also named as Kerhini and Kerhine 
in history became known during the period of Karakoyunlu State that was founded in 
Iraq by the Turkmen.  Kirkuk is between the northern and central parts of Iraq. It is 
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bordered by Mosul and Arbil in the north, Suleymaniyah in the east, Selahaddin in 
the west and Diala in the south.297 
Today Kirkuk is located in the center of the richest oil areas in the Middle 
East. Oil in Kirkuk was discovered in 1927 and production started in 1934. Kirkuk 
oil refinery was constructed, beside Babagurgur oil area, near the city of Kirkuk. Its 
daily production capacity is 27 thousand barrels. It has 22 billion barrels of oil 
reserves together with Rumaila oil area.298 Iraq oil areas, including Kirkuk are at the 
minumum level of cost in terms of oil production in the world and they have a 
potential lifespan of another 100 years.299 In addition, Kirkuk has natural gas beds, 
spas, sulphur reserves and vast areas of very fertile agricultural lands.300 
Hanna Batatu, in her book, pointed out that Kirkuk was a Turkmen city in the 
near past, and that the Kurds from the nearby villages migrated to the city. The main 
factor of this migration was development of the oil industry. By 1959, one third of 
the Kirkuk population was Kurdish, the Turkmen population decreased by 50 %, and 
the Assyrians and Arabs appeared as others.301 
Another finding of Hanna Batatu was that Arbil was being kurdified 
peacefully in The mid 1950s, while this process did not happen in Kirkuk due to the 
close cultural bonds with Turkey as the Turkmen remained to their ethnic identity.302 
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Nouri Talabani, in his book entitled  Arabization of the Kirkuk Region, stated 
that the Arabs who came to the Iraqi Oil Company in Kirkuk in the 1950s adopted 
the Turkmen language.303 In a sense, this is an indicator that the Kirkuk region then 
had a dominant Turkmen population. Kemal Mahzar Ahmed expressed that the 
Turkmen is a fundamental element in Kirkuk and its units in terms of society, culture 
and politics in the context of their modern history.304 
The main reason of the conflict between the Turkmen and the Kurds is 
Kirkuk, which dates back to the 1950s. Relations between Turkmen and the Kurds in 
Kirkuk were normal until the mid 1950s. Although the emergence of the symptoms 
appeared with the increase in the number of the Kurdish population migrating from 
the villages to the Kirkuk. The changing demographic structure affected economic 
interests, social, political and administrative structures, although it did not create a 
reaction which spoiled relations of the Turkmen and the Kurdish people.305 
After 1958 coup, the return of Mollah Mustafa Barzani to Iraq encouraged 
Kurds and started to plan to add the Kirkuk to their territory. They selected the 
Kirkuk region as a target, where there are rich Babagurgur oil beds which they regard 
as an economic source for the state they dreamt of. However, the fact that Kirkuk is 
purely a Turkmen city and that there were few Kurds there, prevented these plans.306 
Mollah Mustafa Barzani declared in 1970s; 
Even if one single person is determined to be of Kurdish origin according to the 
census which shall be conducted, Kirkuk shall be Kurdish territory. If we do 
not conquer Kirkuk, our struggle is useless. The Northern region which was 
legally left to our administration had been already in our hands in the past. Now 
we want Kirkuk.307 
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Moreover, one of the main reasons why the autonomy which had been 
granted to Kurds in 1970 reached a deadlock in 1974 was disagreement about Kirkuk 
between the Arabs and Kurds. The Kurdish groups strongly requested that the Kirkuk 
should be added to their region, but the central administration objected this 
aspiration.308 
The Kurdish political movements promoted an intense migration to the 
Kirkuk. The arabization policy constituted the antithesis of this and the Iraqi 
governments which decided to arabize Kirkuk to secure the oil resources always had 
suspicions about the Turkmen with imaginary fears. Moreover, they changed the 
name of the Kirkuk as “Al Tamim”, which means nationalization in Arabic, and 
refers to the decision of nationalization of the oil sources.309 
Kurdish groups support a federal Iraq after Iraqi War of 2003. Yet, when they 
define the Kurdish region within this structure which makes Kirkuk  the center, they 
cover Kirkuk, Arbil, Suleymaniyah, Aqra, Dohuk, Zimar, Khaniqin, Barda, Sinjar, 
and Sheihkan. KDP and PUK are aware of the fact that a Kurdish region that 
includes Kirkuk shall gain importance in the international conjuncture, and it shall 
always be used as a trump in the bargaining table.310 
After the war of 2003, Mesut Barzani and Celal Talabani made strong 
requests concerning Kirkuk. While these leaders claimed that Kirkuk should be a city 
related to “Kurdish Autonomy Region”, Turkmen leaders stated that Kirkuk is an 
Iraqi city which has Turkmen texture.  Ümit Özdağ stated that; 
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KDP and PUK are isolated, and KDP is implementing a chauvinistic policy 
centered on Kirkuk due to the internal political reasons, and that PUK agrees 
the approach, and that they expect they shall gain more public support. 
However this shall bring very serious damages and move the people of the 
region into a new dead end.311 
 
When a question regarding the Kirkuk Issue was asked of Muzaffer Arslan, 
the president of the INTP, he pointed out that; 
 Since time immemorial, the Kurds symbolized Kirkuk as the capital of 
“Kurdistan”. Especially, Mollah Mustafa Barzani initiated their acts with the 
slogan ‘Kirkuk is the Kudus of the Kurdish people. Of course this is not only a 
moral issue, they targeted Kirkuk as it is one of the most significant oil beds in 
the world because they believe that Kirkuk which is in Northern Iraq having no 
other income source can only stand with the revenues extracted from oil.312 
 
Kirkuk, after the Iraqi war of 2003 was actually handed over to the Kurds by 
Coalition Forces. The Turkmen were not given any place in the decision making 
mechanism. As it seems to be a political extension of Turkey, no political 
representation or role was allocated to ITF. So to speak, USA penalized the Turkmen 
in lieu of Turkey.313 Governors, police commissioners, mayor in Kirkuk are all of 
Kurdish origin. Only one authority is staffed with a Turkmen out of 20 authorities in 
Kirkuk, however that person was assassinated.314  
The KDP and PUK after the Iraqi War of 2003 encouraged Kurdish migration 
into the region by claiming that 300.000 Kurds were forced to migrate from Kirkuk 
during the Baas period.315 Before the war, the number of families which were forced 
to migrate from Kirkuk was reported to be 22.955, in the official newspaper of KDP 
and fake documents were prepared for 100.000 people.316 The Kurdish political 
groups stressed that the city of Kirkuk is a Kurdish city and a part of Kurdish 
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Autonomous Area in both the London meeting of the opposition groups in 
December, 2002, and Arbil-Selahaddin meeting in February, 2003.317  During the 
postwar, the demographic structure of Kirkuk changed considerably.  Ali Mehdi318 
reported that while the population of Kirkuk was 870.000 on 9 April 2003, the figure 
is currently 1.150.000.319 
When the census, which was supposed to take place on 12 October 2004 was 
cancelled due to political and security concerns, the voter-registration rolls were 
decided to be drawn according to the ration cards which were distributed to the 
families within program “Oil for food”, which had been implemented by UN as of 
1996, in accordance with the decision of the High Election Commission in elections 
of January, 2005. This was to prevent the Kurds who migrated to Kirkuk after the 
war to vote. However, KDP and PUK highlighted that they will not allow the Kirkuk 
province council election to be held until article 58 of the Constitution of the Iraqi 
Interim Government is fully implemented. It is necessary for them to prevent the 
Kurds who settled into the region after the Iraq operation. Firstly, when they received 
a negative response from US officials, Kurdish political groups used different 
pressure methods by using threats of withdrawing from the election and they 
convinced US officials. Subsequently, 28 new election bureaus were opened in Iraq, 
and the registration of about 100.000 Kurds who migrated were completed. After the 
election, the Kurds obtained 26 members out of 41 members of Kirkuk Province 
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council. With this election result, Kurds assumed an argument to support the thesis 
that Kirkuk is a Kurdish city, both in Iraq and in the international environment.320  
Knight Ridder Agency which provides news services to the American 
newspapers, reported the American army was worried that ethnic tensions in Kirkuk 
shall convert into large scale violence, and even into civil war. It further indicated 
that after 30 January elections, with a view to including Kirkuk to the Kurdish 
region, the Kurdish migration to the region increasingly goes on. It also reported that 
top US army officers are worried that the Turkmen and Arabs in particular shall rise 
in rebellion with the domino effect, against Kurds.321 
In fact, Kirkuk, since the American invasion, has become a province where 
ethnic power struggle persists between the Arabs, Kurds and the Turkmen. The 
Authorities state that the city can either serve as a model in national integrity or a 
province where civil war can be triggered.322 
 
4.4 The Turkmen Policy of Turkey (2003-2005) 
The negotiations made by the Turkish and the American officials before the 
Iraqi war in 2003 to open the Northern Front from Turkey, (This contractual 
document which is known as memorandum of understanding (MOU) was finalized in 
a positive manner on 8 February 2003. However, the resolution dated 1 March 
2003323 was rejected in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.324 The reason why the 
resolution was rejected can be explained by some political, economic and moral 
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reasons.325 In terms of the Turkmen issue, it may be said that ostracisation of the 
Turkmen especially from the meeting in Selahaddin (26 February-1 March 2003) 
under the guidance of US was effective in the rejection of the resolution.326 
Rejection of the 1 March Resolution caused tension in Turkish-American 
relations. In fact there was and there is an attempt to exclude Turkey from the 
political game over Iraq. Hüseyin Bağcı stated “It is nowadays understood that the 
rejection of the 1 March resolution by Turkey is a right decision in moral terms, but 
wrong in strategic terms”.327   
Serhat Erkmen, a Middle East expert, stressed that; 
The fact that exclusion of Turkey out of the Iraqi equation with the 1 March 
resolution created a great disappointment among the Turkmen, and that 
following this, the looting events of Kirkuk and Mosul strengthened the idea 
among the Turkmen that they are vulnerable.328 
 
During the operation, Turkey was worried about the negative developments 
which can end in a possible massacre against the Turkmen.  Turkey declared its red 
lines,329 gave the signal to intervene and warned the Kurdish groups. However, it was 
thought that Turkish foreign policy had failed in this period against the peshmerge 
invasion of Kirkuk and Mosul in April 2003 and that the prestige of Turkey 
decreased in the world.330 However, Ankara prevented a massacre of the Turkmen331 
Turkey’s policy towards Iraq after of 2003 is oriented towards the protection 
of its territorial integrity, prevention of a Kurdish state there, and observation of the 
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legal security concern of Turkey by prevention of the PKK assaults from Northern 
Iraq and prevent  oppression of the Turkmen.332 
Turkey stated many times that Iraqi territorial integrity should be preserved 
and it is essential that the Turkmen should enjoy equal rights with the other ethnic 
groups. According General İlker Başbuğ, the Deputy Chief of Staff: 
Turkey believes in the protection of the national unity and independence and 
territorial integrity of Iraq. Turkey considers Iraq as a whole not from the 
perspective of ethnic proximity or religious terms. The territorial integrity of 
Iraq is not only a building structure for Iraq but also for the construction of the 
stability in the whole region. Turkey believes that Iraq shall reach peace and 
stability as soon as possible and in this context, the fact that the Turkmen which 
have a considerable rate of the population, enjoy the rights they deserve shall 
contribute to the solutions towards the future of Iraq, as a balancing 
component.333 
 
After the Iraqi War of 2003, It was discussed that Turkey thought about the 
Turkmen very seriously and designed its foreign policy on the basis of this group. 
This would be disadvantageous in terms of Turkey’s internal balances and 
democracy. However, the Turkmen issue is a matter of human rights. To care about 
the Turkmen is an outcome of the geography and history of Turkey, otherwise, 
interpreting this interest by the ethnic links and racism would be extremely wrong. 
To care about the Turkmen is an expected and required result of the Turkish foreign 
policy.334  Furthermore, Turkey considers the Iraqi issue as a whole; the following 
statement is a good example for its approach to the ethnic and religious groups in 
Iraq. Osman Korutürk, Turkey’s Special Envoy to Iraq underlined the following 
regarding Turkey’s policy for Iraq: 
We view Iraq from a global perspective, we do not view it as two separate half 
windows, and in other words Iraq has a Kurdish side, and a Turkmen side, and 
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a Shiite side, and a Sunni side, now we look at Iraq as an integrated entity 
regardless of these separate sides.335 
 
Moreover, in the National Security Council (MGK) report issued on 24 
February 2005, it was highlighted that it is important that Turkey should be in close 
cooperation and dialogue with the new Iraq administration and all of the segments of 
its people in line with the protection of the national unity in Iraq, and Turkey’s policy 
for Iraq should be maintained in close dialogue with all of the segments.336 
The statements about Kirkuk made by the Kurdish politicians such as  
“Kirkuk is the Kudus of the Kurdish people” were met with reaction and worry in 
Ankara. On this subject, Osman Korutürk stated the following:  
We do not view Kirkuk as an internal affair of Iraq, since the territorial 
integrity of Iraq is to the interest of the whole region. It is also to the interest of 
Turkey. A development which can prevent the integrity of Iraq can cause an 
ethnic clash in Iraq. Since the clash can occur in Kirkuk in Iraq, Kirkuk 
concerns all of the neighboring countries and Turkey.337 
 
Likewise; in the press briefing on 26 January 2005, General İlker Başbuğ, the 
Deputy Chief of Staff, pointed that:  
Inclusion of Kirkuk into the Kurdish region before the elections would be the 
first step towards the independent Kurdish state. Kirkuk has vital importance 
for Turkey. The change in the demographic structure of Kirkuk is not only 
related to the election results but also to the future of Kirkuk in the long run. 
This bears a risk not only for Iraq but also for the region. We wish that wrong 
steps should not be taken in this direction. The special status of Kirkuk should 
be preserved. This is of vital importance for Turkey. It cannot be expected that 
Turkey will be silent for the protection of the political rights of the Turkmen 
who are our cognates.338 
 
Murat Bardakçı stated that Turkey started to follow a quite different policy on 
the Kirkuk issue compared to previous behavior, based on Basbug’s statement. 
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Because Turkey interpreted the developments in Kirkuk as the internal affair of Iraq 
and it even prohibited photographs, movies, and other documents regarding the   
massacre of 1959 in order to prevent the agitation of the people in Ankara.339 
Furthermore, the assaults made against Turkmen in this period concerned 
Turkey. Ümit Özdağ, in his articles entitled “Recent developments in Kirkuk”, stated 
that Ankara’s policy towards Turkmen, which is pursued over the Washington, is 
weak, involuntary, and incomplete and it is far from the representing the interests of 
Turkey.340 
The results of the Iraqi elections created disappointment among the Turkish 
officials; Abdullah Gül, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, stated the following;  
I was disappointed regarding the Turkmen in the Iraqi elections. Even though 
we consider that the elections were made through dishonesty, we should ask 
why the Turkmen in Turkey did not vote. There are 35 thousand Iraqi Turkmen 
in Turkey and only 4 thousand of them voted. 2 thousand Turkmen registered 
in Sweden, and 900 voted. ITF could not draw the literate and intellectual 
Turkmen to itself, and include them into their staff.341 
 
In the new period which started in Iraq after the elections, Ankara’s approach 
to the Turkmen was mentioned by Osman Korutürk; 
Take the Turks in Bulgaria as an example, stand on your own feet (In the new 
period, in the democratic process, the Turkmen shall organize themselves, 
prove themselves in Iraq with the democratic mechanisms, and establish their 
political maturity and level of efficiency), prove yourself in the Iraqi policy.  
This approach should not be misinterpreted. It should not be interpreted that the 
support of Turkey is removed or shall be removed. The support of Turkey shall 
always continue. The approach whose framework is drawn by us is the desire 
of the Iraqi Turkmen. The democratic maturity and the political development is 
also what they want. In this process, experience, knowledge and technology 
support shall of course continue.342 
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However when we compare the conditions between the two countries, it is an 
undeniable achievement that the political and other rights of Turks in Bulgaria are 
fully recognized. However Iraq is now under occupation and the conditions are 
diffucult, and the fact that Bulgaria is in the process of EU membership accelerated 
the success of the People and Independences Movement which is the organization of 
the Bulgarian Turks, and it should not be forgotten that democracy experience of  
Bulgaria cannot be compared.343. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION   
 
•    Evaluation of the situation of Turkmen(1921-2005) 
            The Iraqi Turkmen was isolated from Iraqi politics since Iraq was founded.  
Consecutive pro-British governments pursued this policy during the mandate and 
Kingdom era. On the basis of this policy, they aimed to distance them from Turkey. 
The Iraqi Turkmen were exposed to an assimilation policy since the 1930s; 
they were even exposed to massacres in 1924, 1946, 1959 and 1991.  Turkmen 
leaders were killed in particular during the 1959 Kirkuk maccacre and in 1980 by the 
BAAS regime.  
             There are two crucial documents acknowledging the existence of Turkmen in 
Iraq: “the declaration of the kingdom of Iraq” which was announced under the 
signature of the Nouri Said Pasha, the prime minister, upon Iraq’s membership to 
LoN in 1932, and later “Cultural Rights of the Turkmen Nationals” dated 1970. In 
practice, these rights were not applied to the Turkmen. 
            After the end of the coup in 1958, the declaration of republic was interpreted 
by the Turkmen as the end of the assimilation policies on them. But, they were 
exposed to the Kirkuk massacre by using ideological struggle as a cover.  One of the 
most important consequences of this massacre was to unite Turkmen. 
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             The Turkmen lived their most peaceful period between 1963-1968. In the 
Baas period the Turkmen lived through hardest time in Iraq, they were subjected to 
human right abuses, Arabification policy and to be removed by force.  
Arab-Kurd conflicts in Iraq affected the Turkmen negatively and these were bilateral 
oppression in Kirkuk where the Turkmen population was intense, in the 1970s. 
            During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Shiite Turkmen were accused of 
spying for Iran, while before the Turkmen had been accused for spying for Turkey. 
Baghdad used all means to oppress the Turkmen. 
While the safe region was being constructed by US and Britain, Turkey 
approved the region as its strategic preference. It leaded to stay %85 and % 90 
Turkmen populations in Baas regime. As a natural result of this preference, a strong 
Turkmen opposition could not be organized. In 2003, it leads to their political 
weakness. The Turkmen made use of peaceful methods in their political struggles, 
and they followed policies which reject violance. The political activities of the 
Turkmen accelarated after Gulf War II in Northern Iraq, however, political strength 
of the Iraqi Turkmen remained limited to only Arbil and a few settlement centers in 
Northern Iraq between 1991-2003. Establishment of the No-Fly zone fostered 
Kurdish Nationalism in Northern Iraq. The establishment of “Iraqi Turkmen Front” 
in 1995 was a turning point of the Turkmen political movement for harboring the 
Turkmen parties. But, the Turkmen were exposed to KDP pressures and attacks lead 
by Barzani in particular since 1996. Because, they were perceived as an obstacle by 
Kurdish groups for the state they have dreamt. 
After the Iraqi War of 2003, the Turkmen was isolated from the 
reconstruction of new Iraq by the Coalition Forces. The Turkmen met this with 
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worry. Indeed, the opposition meetings after Gulf War II (1991) may be symptom of 
this situation.  
After the Iraqi War of 2003, the Turkmen have faced Kurdification policies; 
in particular the migration of Kurds to Kirkuk will lead to kurdify the region in the 
long term. 
             One of the main reasons of the Turkmen’ not being able to express 
themselves to the world was that there is not certain data about their population. The 
data, however, should be ready after the first census to be held after the permament 
constitution is ratified. 
             The Turkmen have paid for the lands where they lived with rich oil wells, 
underground and ground sources, natural gases and wide agricultural areas. They will 
certainly pay for in the future. 
 
• Evaluation of Turkey’s Policy towards Turkmen; 
          Turkey did not have a specific foreign policy towards the Turkmen between 
1921-1991. We may refer this to the general framework of “Turkish Foreign Policy” 
at this period. Although Iraq-Turkey relations were developing in a good way, the 
situation of Turkmen was not included in the agreements signed by two countries. 
Turkey used diplomatic channels against the oppressive policies and massacres of the 
Turkmen, but did not get specific results. Ankara supported the idea that whichever 
rights the Kurds enjoyed, should also be given to the Turkmen.  
Although activities of Turkey towards the Turkmen increased from 1991 to 
1996, these activities remained limited. They focused on education and cultural areas 
in general, and the food assistance extended by Kızılay. In 1996, the Turkmen joined 
the Ankara process but it ended after the Washington process in 1998. 
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Turkish officials made statements after the Iraqi war of 2003 that defended 
Turkmen’s rights.  Turkey has demanded the same political, cultural and social rights 
for Turkmen as the other ethnic groups. Turkey should defend the rights of Turkmen 
in terms of human rights and international law, by pursing active policies. This 
should be pointed out during the negotiations with the other ethnic or religios groups 
living in Iraq. 
Turkey should pursue a new policy that provides the termination of the idea 
that “The Turkmen are the spy agency of Turkey in the area”. These claims are all 
manipulations of the local groups which aim to benefit from this.  
            Turkey should give support to Turkmen economic and cultural dimensions to 
make them a political and economical power in Iraq. Besides, the Turkmen are 
important for Turkey for security reasons.The state policy of Turkey is not to let the 
Kurdish State be established. Both the Turkmen policy and Turkish policy are on the 
same line in defending territorial and political integrity of Iraq.  
 
• Projection for the future: 
            The Turkmen supported the idea that Kirkuk is an Iraqi city with Turkmen 
texture. But, Kurdish groups claim that Kirkuk is a Kurdish city and should be 
annexed to Kurdish autonomous state by using the suitable condition after the war of 
2003. They have changed the demograpfic structure of the province. Kirkuk city is 
called as little Iraq with its ethnic mixture; Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, 
Kildanians, Shiites and Sunnis. The status of the Kirkuk should be determined by 
consensus of local citizens, Iraqi citizens, regional countries, Arab states and 
Coalition Forces. The best solution for Kirkuk should be its annexation to Baghdad 
with a special status.  
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Futhermore, ethnic and sectarian groups are clamoring to secure their position 
in the post Saddam era, “In Iraq’s matrix” We can define it as a jigsaw puzzle which 
is a picture printed on card-board or wood, that has been cut up into a lot of small 
pieces of different shapes that you have to fit together again to complete a puzzle. 
What happens in Northern Iraq is a mysterious situation in which it is not easy to 
understand all the causes of what is happening, thus a complicated problem. If it is to 
be solved, all pieces (actors, groups) should be fit together and needed. But, the US 
has pursued policies in favor of Kurds rather than balancing policy among all the 
ethnic groups in Northern Iraq. The tension between ethnic groups has been going up 
since the wrong policies of US and misperceived by Kurds especially in Kirkuk, a 
microcosm of Iraq nowadays, with its multi- ethnic mix.  Indeed, It may lead the start 
of the conflicts among ethnic identities in Iraq. 
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